Why Indonesia Is Betting on India’s BrahMos & Astra Not China’s Missiles

Shifting Missile Choices In Southeast Asia

For years, Southeast Asian militaries were expected to lean either toward US weapons or Chinese systems, creating a bipolar defence market in the region. That landscape is changing: Indonesia’s decision to import India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Astra beyond‑visual‑range air‑to‑air missiles marks a clear move toward a “third option” that avoids dependence on either Washington or Beijing.

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 2026 visit to Jakarta, an Indian government official confirmed that India will supply both BrahMos and Astra to Indonesia in a deal estimated around 630 million dollars, making Indonesia a major customer of Indian missile technology.timesofindia.

This package sits inside a broader strategic partnership that includes defence cooperation, critical minerals and maritime security, signaling that missiles are only one part of a deeper realignment.

The China Problem: Natuna Sea And Sovereignty

Indonesia’s missile shopping list cannot be understood without the North Natuna Sea.

Chinese fishing fleets and coastguard vessels have repeatedly entered Indonesian waters in and around the Natuna Islands, citing Beijing’s “nine‑dash line” and “traditional fishing grounds”, directly clashing with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Incidents since 2016 such as a Chinese coastguard ship ramming a detained trawler to free it from Indonesian authorities have convinced Jakarta that it needs credible deterrence at sea, not just diplomatic protests.

The Indonesian military’s new joint defence commands have been deployed to push Chinese vessels out of these waters, but analysts caution that sea control and air superiority require modern missiles and sensors, not just coastguard patrols.journals.

In this context, buying Chinese high‑end missiles to counter Chinese incursions would create an obvious strategic dependency on the very actor that is testing Indonesia’s EEZ – politically difficult for any Indonesian government to justify.

Strategic Autonomy: Hedging Without Choosing Sides

Indonesia’s fundamental foreign‑policy instinct is non‑alignment and strategic autonomy: cooperate with major powers, but avoid formal alliances or one‑sided dependence. Scholars describe Jakarta’s approach as a “balancing act” between contestation and cooperation with China resisting maritime overreach while keeping economic projects and investment flowing.

Buying from India fits neatly into this logic.

Unlike China, India has no territorial disputes with Indonesia and does not assert claims in the South China Sea; unlike the US, India is not part of a rigid alliance structure that might drag Jakarta into great‑power confrontations. Indian weapons therefore allow Indonesia to strengthen its deterrent posture against Chinese behaviour in the Natuna Sea without symbolically “joining a camp” against Beijing.

As one analysis of the looming BrahMos deal notes, India offers “advanced, affordable, and non‑coercive defence technology” that comes without sanctions risks or hegemonic baggage, which is particularly attractive for middle powers like Indonesia.

Why BrahMos Beats Chinese Missiles For Jakarta

Performance And Versatility

The BrahMos missile, jointly developed by India and Russia, is widely regarded as one of the world’s fastest operational cruise missiles, capable of speeds around Mach 3 with export ranges near 290 km.
It can be launched from land, sea and air platforms, giving Indonesia a layered coastal denial capability along its vast archipelagic coastline.

Indonesian defence commentary highlights BrahMos for its superior accuracy reported circular error probable of roughly a meter and precision against high‑value maritime targets. Some local analysts explicitly argue that BrahMos edges out Chinese offerings like the CM‑302 in overall capability and integration potential, even though Indonesia has explored Chinese missiles as part of a broader diplomatic balancing strategy.

Deterrence Against Chinese Incursions

If deployed along key stretches of Indonesia’s vulnerable coasts, BrahMos coastal batteries could create a high‑speed “missile umbrella” over critical maritime corridors near the Natuna Sea and Malacca approaches. Such a capability significantly complicates Chinese naval and coastguard operations in the area, making any incursion potentially costly and risky, which is exactly what Jakarta needs to reinforce its EEZ claims.

Chinese missiles would not send the same signal. Buying BrahMos from India lets Indonesia build deterrence against Chinese grey‑zone activities, while purchases of Chinese hardware tend to be interpreted as political reassurance rather than hard balancing.

Astra: The Air‑Combat Edge India Can Offer

Tailor‑Made For Sukhoi Fleets

Indonesia’s air force relies heavily on Russian‑origin Sukhoi fighters (Su‑27/30 family), which have faced challenges with sanctions risks and spare‑parts politics. India’s Astra Mk‑I was developed by DRDO specifically for platforms like the Su‑30MKI, giving it a natural integration advantage for Indonesia’s Sukhoi fleet compared with many Chinese BVR missiles optimised for PLAAF aircraft.

Astra is now export‑ready, has been successfully tested and inducted by the Indian Air Force, and is designed to reduce dependence on foreign BVR missiles such as the Russian R‑77 and Israeli Derby. Indonesia can essentially plug into this ecosystem, gaining a proven BVR missile for its existing aircraft without overhauling its entire avionics and logistics chain to fit Chinese systems.

Combat Credibility And Regional Signalling

Reports on Astra’s operational use in Indian air‑combat operations have boosted its reputation as a combat‑proven missile rather than a purely test‑range system. For Jakarta, choosing Astra from India rather than a Chinese equivalent sends a message to other Southeast Asian states: Indonesia is modernising its air‑combat capabilities through diversified, non‑Chinese channels, reinforcing the broader trend of regional defence diversification.

Operation Sindoor Aftereffect

The biggest “proof of concept” for BrahMos came during Operation Sindoor, India’s large‑scale retaliatory campaign against Pakistan after the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack. BrahMos was used in combat for the first time, launched from Su‑30 MKI aircraft to hit multiple Pakistani airbases and high‑value targets with devastating effect.

Sources say BrahMos’s performance in Sindoor “exceeded expectations”, delivering high‑precision strikes that crippled Pakistan’s air defence network and airbase infrastructure across at least 11 major bases.

India’s indigenously developed BrahMos destroyed Pakistani air bases, Pakistan’s Chinese‑supplied air defence system remained unused, exposing the gap between Beijing’s exported systems on paper and their actual combat employment.

Indian and international analyses of Sindoor further note that Chinese‑linked systems like the HQ‑9 and associated radar networks were blinded or neutralised through Indian electronic warfare and missile tactics, reinforcing the perception that BrahMos‑led Indian strikes outperformed Chinese and US‑origin air defence technologies on the Pakistani side.

For Indonesia’s defence community, Sindoor is an important data point: BrahMos is no longer just a brochure missile, but a system that has proved itself under real combat conditions against a mixed US‑Chinese air defence architecture.

Astra also earned its “combat‑proven” tag during Operation Sindoor. Indian and regional coverage note that Astra was employed in the air‑combat component of Sindoor, giving Indian fighters a decisive BVR edge and contributing to the downing or deterrence of Pakistani aircraft and drones across the theatre.

Indonesia is looking at the missile specifically because it performed exceptionally in Operation Sindoor, cementing its reputation as a reliable, accurate BVR weapon rather than an untested prototype. For Indonesian planners, the fact that Astra proved itself in a complex, multi‑domain operationagainst opponents using a mix of Western and Chinese kit makes it far more attractive than Chinese BVR missiles whose real‑world performance remains largely untested or opaque.

In short, both BrahMos and Astra have already gone through serious war‑time “trial by fire” in Operation Sindoor and come out on top, while Chinese‑linked systems on the Pakistani side struggled to deliver the protection they promised on paper.

Technology Transfer And Local Industry Gains

One of the most attractive aspects of the BrahMos deal for Indonesia is the transfer‑of‑technology (ToT) component.
Indian and regional defence sources note that the agreement includes provisions for Indonesia to manufacture certain components domestically, integrating its industry into the BrahMos supply chain and supporting local jobs.

Similarly, India has been actively promoting Astra Mk‑I at international airshows and briefing countries like Indonesia and Vietnam on the missile’s export‑ready status, signalling a willingness to share indigenous technology rather than keep it fully black‑boxed. Chinese suppliers, by contrast, have typically been more cautious about offering deep ToT on sensitive systems, especially to countries that might one day use them in contested waters against Chinese forces.

For Jakarta, ToT and local workshare are crucial: they help build domestic capabilities, reduce long‑term dependence on foreign suppliers and fit into President Prabowo Subianto’s agenda of aggressive defence modernisation with strong local industry participation.

Political Comfort: India As A “Safe” Security Partner

Buying missiles from India is politically easier for Indonesia than buying top‑tier Chinese weapons for several reasons.
First, India does not assert claims over Indonesian territory or EEZ, and has no history of physically challenging Indonesian ships or aircraft in its waters.

Second, India’s rising role in the Indo‑Pacific is widely perceived as non‑hegemonic: it offers capability and partnership without demanding formal alignment or making intrusive political demands.

Chinese hardware comes with different optics.

In a domestic political environment where China is simultaneously a major investor and a maritime challenger, large‑scale acquisitions of Chinese strategic missiles could be framed by critics as “arming the very power that tests our sovereignty”, a narrative any Indonesian government would prefer to avoid.

With India, Jakarta can strengthen deterrence in the Natuna Sea, join a growing network of BrahMos‑equipped states (Philippines, potentially Vietnam), and still claim to be non‑aligned and independent of great‑power blocs.

A New Indo‑Pacific Missile Geometry

If Indonesia fully operationalises BrahMos and Astra alongside the Philippines and possibly Vietnam, the Indo‑Pacific will start to see a new missile geometry emerge. Analysts describe this as a “triangular deterrence matrix” stretching from the Luzon Strait to the Natuna Sea and the Sunda – Malacca axis, creating multiple points of resistance to coercive naval behaviour.

In that matrix, Indonesia’s choice of Indian missiles over Chinese ones matters enormously. It shows that regional middle powers are no longer limited to buying from superpowers with heavy political baggage; they can instead rely on India as a credible defence supplier that offers speed, precision and technology access without demanding loyalty oaths.

For Jakarta, the decision to look to India for BrahMos and Astra is therefore not just about hardware. It is a statement that Indonesia intends to deter China, diversify partners, and defend its waters on its own terms, using missiles that strengthen sovereignty rather than deepen dependency.