I. The Doctrine of Inevitable Integration: Contextualizing India’s New Stance
A. The Significance of Rajnath Singh’s “Main bhi Bharat Hoon” Declaration
In September 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a vehement declaration in front of an Indian diaspora in Morocco about Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), stating that India shall acquire it without resorting to forcible means. The underlying major premise of Singh’s statement read: “PoK will be ours on its own. Demands have already started surfacing there… It will itself say, ‘Main bhi Bharat hoon.’ (I am India too). That day will come”.
This sort of rhetoric is not solely aspirational; it does indeed seem representative of a major strategic repositioning on the part of New Delhi. The statement articulated the potential grieving integration of the Pakistan-administered territories-Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK or Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir PoJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)-not because of Indian kinetic action but because of the will of the internal polity of that region. It, therefore, gives India essential diplomatic and strategic cover under which it can completely exploit the ever-growing instability within Pakistan, portraying a certainty that time and internal pressures are anyway working in New Delhi’s favour.
B. Historical Evolution of India’s PoK Claim: From Passive Resolution to Assertive Irredentism
Instrument of Accession to India, Signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh on 26 October 1947. (via Raksha Anirveda)
India’s historical approach to reclaiming territories administered by Pakistan often reflects hesitancy and a lack of sustained political will. At times, it has lost opportunities for strategic advantage. Historical accounts note that Operation Trident in 1986 marked the last major attempt to annex Skardu, but India called it off under diplomatic pressure. Thus, all these years, the half-hearted pursuit of the PoK claim established a relatively passive diplomatic stance for India primarily centered on internationalizing Pakistan’s historic aggression rather than really preparing for and pushing change on the ground.
The present government intends to change that perception. The forceful tone signals a shift from the passive claims often tied to United Nations resolutions toward active assertions of irredentism. These assertions do not indicate imminent military action; rather, they align with Islamabad’s current geopolitical vulnerability, allowing India to exploit opportunities once Pakistan’s internal political conditions ripen.
C. The Post-2019 Strategic Pivot as Precursor to the Current Rhetoric
The great course for this new strategic confidence was laid through a series of sweeping constitutional changes enacted on the 5th of August 2019. The nullification of Article 370 of the Indian constitution, withdrawing the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir of its special status, thereby reorganizing it into two Union Territories-Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, had created a fundamental change vis-a-vis the Indian side of the LoC in the legal and constitutional status quo.
While the move had security restrictions imposed in the Kashmir Valley, resulting in immense domestic controversy, it put the citizens of the new Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh under full constitutional provisions-against central laws (Right to Education, Right to Information, and even reservations for the socially backward) and developmental schemes. This shift, therefore, created a sharp constitutional distinction from the scenario on the Pakistan-Administered side. The persons of PoJK and Gilgit-Baltistan continue to function under an interim status, facing a scenario of “obligations without rights”. This constitutional limbo keeps out a true democratic horizon to claim and inhibits an access to the full protective framework of citizenship.
This constitutional limbo effectively subverts true democratic accountability and access to the whole gamut of citizenship protections. Therefore, the Indian manoeuvre after 2019 sends an extremely loud political signal to the residents of PoJK and GB; New Delhi will offer true constitutional integration and rights in equity. By presenting eventually functioning governance that does grant full rights, this dichotomization weaponizes equality constitutionally, giving concrete appeal to the “Main bhi Bharat Hoon” rhetoric.
II. The Structural Collapse of Governance in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (PoJK)
A. The Constitutional Quagmire: Obligations Without Rights in PoJK and Gilgit-Baltistan
In this way, the two territories have lived in political and constitutional limbo for over seventy years. Though by virtue of its administration, Islamabad enjoys control over this region, it has consistently rejected giving either territory full provincial status, largely to preserve the negotiating position that the final status of Kashmir is not at all decided. This mechanism leaves the citizens functioning under a “façade of autonomy”. To those whom the law designates as public servants, such as teachers and doctors, Pakistan flies its flag; however, their rights are qualified as “provisional”.
Such systematic constitutional refusal prevents local governance from being truly accountable. Without the umbrella of the provincial legal framework, Islamabad, the central government, takes visible and mostly de facto decisions concerning important policy and resource matters. This leaves long-term corruption, disinvestment, and administrative neglect in its wake. With the failure to demarcate and embark on the path of constitutional resolution-barring, of course, an amendment to Article 257 of the Pakistan Constitution recognizing the two territories as provinces on a provisional basis-this unyielding nature of the arrangement has very much weakened the foundation of trust between state and citizens.
B. Financial Mismanagement and Exploitation: The Mangla and Neelum-Jhelum Legacy
The underlying grievances of the locals are fuelled by a feeling of economic exploitation—directly linked to administration and management of crucial infrastructure and resources. PoJK is one of the main power producers by means of hydropower in Pakistan, housing enormous projects like that of Mangla Dam and the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project.
As big as the projects are, their territories have been maladroitly managed and harassed by activity displacement. Valued at over Rs 500 billion, the Neelum-Jhelum project shall remain bereft of any revenues, contractual disputes unresolved, structural defects to the core, and its closure indefinite. Land disputes emanating from an investment worth trillions of rupees are related to the Mangla Dam and have run their course over decades in courts, with Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) nearly doing nothing to make any headway in majority.
The long-standing nature of issues awaiting resolution demonstrates a resource colonialism narrative: PoJK offers massive hydro resources but has exorbitant electricity tariffs and unsteady infrastructure. The very contradiction of generating huge national power yet negating the local populace in terms of cheap electricity and service stability, turns the popular imagination toward the view that Islamabad treats PoJK and GB not as equals entitled to revenue sharing and infrastructure stability but as resource colonies. This structural exploitation forms the foundation for the anti-establishment sentiment expressed during the recent protests.
C. The Deepening Economic Crisis in Pakistan and Its Direct Impact on Subsidies and Governance
The structural governance failures in PoJK are exacerbated by the crippling federal economic fragility gripping Pakistan. The necessity for the federal government to impose fiscal austerity measures, including the withdrawal of key subsidies, directly triggered the civil unrest of 2024.
When the 2024 protests erupted in May to kill demonstrators and law enforcement, their immediate first response was to give in under pressure from Islamabad. 83 million dollars (PKR 23 billion) of subsidy were declared by the government, and it also directed the regional government to cut down costs of wheat flour and electricity. This expensive, last-minute concession points to the seriousness of the crisis. The unrest subdued for a while, but it clearly pointed to the current unsustainable structure for governance within PoJK, wherein the Islamabad authorities would only rely upon stark, reactionary, and wallet-burning financial rescues. This sort of attitude informs the local population that serious political and economic reform can only be achieved through massive, sustained mobilization from civil society.
III. The Boiling Point: Analysing the 2024 PoJK Protests
A. The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) and the Mobilization of Civil Society
The intensity and extent of organization in the unrest in 2024 grew to unprecedented levels. The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a combination of various civil society groups, took time to lead the demonstrations. The JAAC mobilized mass demonstrations, indefinite strike actions, and total lockdowns, demanding the realization of fundamental rights. This capacity to organize signals the rise of a successful decentralized resistance able to undermine federal authority and exact certain political and economic concessions from Islamabad.
B. From Electricity Bills to Anti-Establishment Fury: The Transition of Grievances
In the beginning, the protests talked of literal economic distress caused by issues of steep electricity bills, the withdrawal of wheat subsidies, and tax relief. Soon, however, the agitation morphed into an outright political movement against the Government of Pakistan and the military establishment.
This transition was evidenced by the slogans adopted by the agitators moving beyond economic demands onto the political realm. The protesters chanted, “Rulers, beware, we are your doom” and “Kashmir is ours, we will decide its fate”. The leaders of the movement accused the authorities of “decades of neglect, corruption, and denial of rights”. This ideological evolution is a grim turning point: it shows a fissure in the central government’s moral legitimacy rather than just a failure of administration.
The protestors also wanted to dismantle institutionally set political manoeuvring and sought the annulment of the 12 assembly seats in PoJK reserved for Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan. This demand essentially targets an alleged method utilized by the central government to create a thumbprint over the region’s political composition, thereby furthering the sentiment that the governments regard the local population as their enemies. This widespread, open challenge to the establishment, particularly the military, validates the strategic premise put forth by the Indian Defence Minister- that the drive for change is now originating internally within PoJK.
C. The Confrontation with Federal Authority: Civilian Demands and the Military Response
The demonstrations saw a heavy clampdown in terms of security.The violence escalated rapidly, killing at least three policemen and several civilians. Some reports claimed that security forces shot dead twelve protesters in Muzaffarabad and several others in Dheerkot and Dadyal. As the law-and-order situation deteriorated, authorities deployed additional security forces and completely shut down mobile, internet, and landline services across the already restive region.
As such, the imposition of force and communication restrictions mirrored the methods used in Kashmir under Indian administration after 2019. But the political outcome was entirely different. In PoJK, the crackdown was on citizens clamouring for basic economic rights and some relief from corruption. The excessive force silenced any opposing voices, and the local narrative went unchallenged: that the government cared more about safeguarding official privileges and federal control than the welfare of the common man, thus rendering the federal government’s use of force politically toxic and deepening local hatred.
D. Analysing the Short-Term Concessions and Long-Term Instability
Faced with massive and sustained civil disobedience, Shehbaz Sharif’s central government constitutionally made a negotiating panel, and in the end, accepted all demands of the JAAC. There was the announcement of the 23 billion PKR grant, subsidized prices for wheat and electricity, and the establishment of a judicial commission to examine high officials’ privileges.
At the strike’s termination, these concessions set the dangerous precedent of “extortionary governance.” The central administration signalled that real change and financial allotment only come with the threat of violent civil unrest. This outcome encourages further mobilization by the JAAC to ensure the continuation of an ever-repeating circle where Islamabad must now essentially pay political and financial ransom to gain temporary stability. This expenditure poisons an already collapsing federal budget and speaks to the inherent structural weakness of the central administration, confirming hence that local PoJK government structures are mere proxies operated at the will of an erratic federal financial capacity.
The immediate concessions, though necessary for an immediate de-escalation, would, however, let the core constitutional and resource exploitation grievances stand whole and, therefore, perpetuate the anti-Pakistan sentiment.
IV. Gilgit-Baltistan: The Strategic Core and the China Factor
A. Gilgit-Baltistan: the geopolitical hinge
The GB region has been geographically defined in contrast to PoJK, and is therefore in the very heart of the broader conflict. Adjacent to China’s Xinjiang and situated at the crossroads of South-Central Asia, GB presents a priceless opportunity to employ unilateral pressure against China in any two-front scenario. Any change in the status of GB must be evaluated considering Beijing’s weighty strategic stakes there.
B. CPEC and local sentiment: economic gains vs. sovereignty
Passing through GB, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC is central to China’s overland energy and trade security. From Pakistan’s point of view, CPEC holds magical promise for transformation, whereas the local opinion in GB communities is mixed: there is strong local support for the immediate economic and social benefits, yet there is a sustained frustration with GB’s provisional legal status and lack of full constitutional rights. This contrasts with PoJK, in which economic distress provides fuel to dissent; in GB, the grievance lies in the lack of political and constitutional recognition. This distinction, therefore, limits the efficacy of the economic-relief messaging put forth by India (“Main bhi Bharat Hoon”) and necessitates that India position constitutional equality and sovereignty front and centre in its outreach.
C. China’s deepening stake and strategic constraints on India
Treating CPEC (estimated to be a $62 billion project) as a line of life for national security, instability in GB is perceived by China as a direct strategic threat. China opposes any unilateral attempt at status quo alterations — including criticism against New Delhi’s constitutional manoeuvres post-2019 — and retaliate sternly to anything perceived as a threat to the CPEC. At this point, Indian options get constrained: any kinetic move in GB would guarantee near-immediate military and diplomatic backlash by China, which would render a two-front gamble unacceptable. Therefore, New Delhi does indeed consciously opt for the non-kinetic track, emphasizing the exploitation of Pakistan’s internal political weaknesses instead of the military one (as emphasized by Rajnath Singh).
V. The Geopolitical Risk Matrix and Strategic Confidence
A. The Two-Front Challenge: Managing the Sino-Pakistani Axis
The strategic environment of India is shaped by the constant threat of a coordinated Sino-Pakistani (China-Pakistan) axis. Even when tensions may vary, the structural problem remains, hence calling for continuous military preparedness, that in turn places serious drain on resources. Instability in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) comes with both opportunities and dangers for India; for the leadership in Pakistan might escalate the agitation along the LoC to divert public mind away from its own domestic crises, and thereby entrain China to exert parallel pressure along the LAC. For New Delhi, the aim is to exploit this instability while ensuring that it does not escalate to wider conflict, especially in Gilgit-Baltistan where China has large stakes.
B. India’s Patience Strategy: Leveraging Internal Instability without Military Escalation
India’s changing posture seems to stand on the premise that “PoK will be ours on its own.” This reflects confidence in Pakistan’s inevitable downward spiral due to economic collapse, failures in governance, and constitutional paralysis. India uses this governance difference across the LoC as a method of strategic encroachment: by extending constitutional rights and development in J&K and Ladakh, while Pakistan exploits resources in PoJK without bothering to confer any full rights. This rather non-kinetic approach minimizes any risk of military escalation, steers clear of China’s red lines in GB, and instead puts diplomatic pressure on Pakistan by playing up Pakistan’s instability and bad human rights record.
C. Scenarios for Pakistani Fragmentation: Implications for Territorial Integrity and Nuclear Stability
The exacerbated crises raise apprehensions as to the long-term cohesion and security of its nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. So, at the forefront of all global powers-the United States in particular-is nuclear stability as compared to territorial squabbles. India should, therefore, be reframing its diplomatic messaging to reassure its partners that any modifications concerning PoK status would be borne out of legitimate local demands and civil rights, rather than opportunistic military actions. Such a framing only enables India to assert itself as a responsible player on the global stage, and thereby Russia increasingly looked upon as crisis-ridden and unstable.
VI. Strategic Confidence and the Road Ahead for New Delhi
A. Policy Recommendations for Diplomatic and Information Warfare in PoJK/GB
India must keep its foot on the pedal and strengthen its multiple diplomatic and informational campaigns to fully reap the benefits of shifting dynamics. The campaign must, always, create a louder voice for the human-rights abuses, economic exploitation, and constitutional denial storyline set in PoJK and GB. The legitimate grievance demonstrations by groups like JAAC must be given the most international exposure possible, with stark contrasts being drawn on issues where the Indian Union Territories have made constitutional and development strides.
The media- and social-platform-targeted assault is crucial to such a strategy. An information-warfare campaign must stress the fact that Pakistan’s concessions in 2024 were reactive and financially volatile, leaving the primary issues of resource revenue, constitutional rights, and systemic corruption untouched. This further galvanizes support for stable, rights-based integration promoted by New Delhi.
B. Preparing for Contingencies: Economic and Humanitarian Planning
Although the present approach emphasizes non-kinetic acquisitions stemming from internal demand, New Delhi ought to prepare a set of comprehensive contingency plans for eventual reintegration. Such contingency planning must bear in mind the economic rehabilitation prospects for PoJK and GB, including those concerning the comprehensive integration of their distinct cultural identities and constitutional differences into the Indian federal structure.
Learning from the failures in administration and communication during the 2019 rollout in Jammu and Kashmir, pre-emptive preparation with regard to the transition of governance, economic integration, as well as civilian management must be forged should the situation in PoJK rapidly evolve either toward fragmentation or an immediate political demand for reunification.
C. India’s Confidence as a Reflection of Pakistan’s Decline
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s declaration that PoK would eventually exclaim “Main bhi Bharat hoon” had nothing to do with impending military action but instead was an astute observation of the declining internal structure of Pakistan. Chronic constitutional paralysis, an unsustainable economic model that is halting retention of crucial subsidies, and outright ineptitude in management of priority infrastructure like the Mangla and Neelum-Jhelum projects sets the road for potential reintegration.
The 2024 protests in PoJK, vested by the JAAC, gave a stark revelation of the anti-establishment mood and of the tenuous political control Islamabad has over the territory. Islamabad’s reaction in the form of expensive reactive concessions has nullified its own position, further legitimizing the method of protest.
The current Indian policy seems to be that of waiting for the fruit of Pakistan’s internal contradictions to fall. Choosing a low-risk, non-confrontational approach, New Delhi is thus maximizing the geopolitical leverage arising from Pakistan’s domestic crisis, while carefully managing the strategic constraints imposed by Chinese vested interests in Gilgit-Baltistan through the pivotal CPEC corridor. Such confidence expressed by the Indian Defence Minister is thus deeply embedded in the analytic certainty that Pakistan’s failures of governance, brought about by Pakistan itself, will eventually drive, after the citizens of PoJK and GB, toward wanting integration with a state that would guarantee them stability, rights, and constitutional equality.
