The developing Russia-China alliance is the term in today’s geopolitical corridors on changing dynamics in global politics. For Westerners, the Russia-China alliance isn’t a newly discovered phenomenon. They have been consuming frightful tales of Russia-China bonhomie since the Cold War. However, today, the power dynamics have taken a one-eighty. Russia, which used to be a big daddy for China during the Cold War, has now been reduced to a junior partner in the Russia-China alliance. Today, Washington regards the synergy between Russian military prowess and Chinese economic might as a living nightmare for the US-led world order. However, this was not always the case. Little do people know about a point in world history when the Soviet Union decided to nuke China, only to be prevented by America. Yes, you read correctly! Let’s turn the pages of history and recall the Ussuri River Crisis and how it’s relevant today.
USSURI RIVER CLASHES: SOVIETS SPOOKED TO NUKE CHINA
The Ussuri River clashes, also known as the Sino-Soviet border conflict 1969, were a series of military engagements between the Soviet Union and China along their shared border, primarily around the Ussuri River and the adjacent Amur River. Here’s a comprehensive analysis of the conflict:
- Historical Background: The roots of the conflict can be traced back to unresolved territorial disputes dating back to the 19th century, particularly during the expansion of the Russian Empire into the Far East and China’s Qing Dynasty. The border between the two countries was unclear, leading to territorial claims and tensions.
Soviet white-clad troops tussled hand-to-hand with Chinese troops.
- Ideological Differences: The clash occurred during a period of ideological divergence between the Soviet Union and China. Despite both being Communist states, they had significant ideological and strategic differences. These differences intensified after the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization.
- Border Disputes: The specific trigger for the clashes was a dispute over Damansky Island (Zhenbao Island in Chinese), located in the Ussuri River. Both countries claimed sovereignty over the island, which led to a buildup of troops and tensions in the area.
- Escalation: The clashes began on March 2, 1969, when Chinese troops ambushed Soviet border guards on Damansky Island. This led to a firefight that resulted in casualties on both sides. Subsequent clashes occurred in other parts of the border region, including artillery bombardments and skirmishes. The clashes involved the deployment of military forces, including infantry, artillery, and air support, on both sides of the border. The Soviet Union mobilised significant military assets, including troops from the Trans-Baikal and Siberian military districts, to counter the Chinese incursions.
- Resolution and Aftermath: In September 1969, both sides agreed to a ceasefire and began withdrawing their troops from the border areas. The conflict had significant implications for Sino-Soviet relations, further exacerbating the ideological and strategic divide between the two Communist powers. It also influenced China’s foreign policy, leading to a period of alignment with the United States against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
THE AMERICAN BLUFF: GUARDING THE DRAGON
Following the Chinese ambush on March 2, 1969, the Soviets retaliated with heavy bombardment of Chinese military installations and blustering Damansky Island. The war created an environment of animosity between once-Communist homeboys. Huge anti-China and anti-Soviet protests and agitations rocked Moscow and Beijing, respectively. In China, the official press printed that it was time to ‘defeat the new tsar’ and prepared the public for a war. While in Moscow, anti-Chinese protestors surrounded the Chinese embassy and burned cars in front of it. Filled with resentment at Chinese perfidy, the Soviet Union rallied thousands of troops to its far east and prepared its nuclear-armed missiles. The Soviets expressed their intentions to nuke China to their Eastern European allies. Anatoli Dobrynin, the then-Soviet ambassador in Washington, informed Henry Kissinger about their intentions and asked America to remain neutral. On the contrary, the Nixon administration leaked Soviet plans to the press.
It was around early October, and a war frenzy prevailed both in China and the Soviet Union. Lin Biao, then second-in-command in China, ordered the army to move from its bases and residents of major cities to dig shelters and store food. Before launching nuclear weapons, Moscow sought the opinion of Washington. Feared the impact of a nuclear war on US troops stationed in the Indo-Pacific and driven by its ambitions to include China in its anti-Soviet bandwagon, Kissinger warned the Soviet ambassador on October 15 that the US would not stay neutral and would attack Soviet cities in retaliation. Taken aback by the US response, Moscow scrapped its plan on October 20 and began negotiations with China in Beijing. The crisis was over. Many analysts today believe that it was a hollow threat made by Kissinger. Bluff or not, it worked.
AFTERMATH: BLOOMING US-CHINA RELATIONS
In the aftermath of this incident, the world witnessed a sprouting US-China bonhomie. Under the Nixon administration, the US tried to court China in its block against its arch-nemesis, the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger is regarded as the pioneer of the US-China relationship in the Cold War era. Kissinger was tasked with surreptitiously visiting China for talks with Zhou Enlai, which he saw as “historic.” During this visit, he secured an invitation from Zhou for Nixon to visit China. In 1971, a U.S. table tennis team was in Japan when they were invited to play in China. This bit of “ping pong diplomacy” represented the first contact between Chinese and American citizens since 1949. It was regarded as a symbol of improved relations between the two countries. Subsequently, in June 1971, Nixon stunned the world when he announced he would go to China to meet with Mao.
Dictator Mao with US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
On February 21, 1972, Nixon landed in Beijing and became the first US president to visit China while in office. This visit culminated in an agreement known as the Shanghai Communiqué. The Communiqué talked about the two sides working towards diplomatic recognition, with the Nixon administration agreeing that the United States would end its official recognition of Taiwan, which China claimed was part of its “People’s Republic.” This visit was opposed by Taiwan, and as a result, Nixon assured them that they had nothing to worry about. Despite everything, normalisation of relations with China was not fully achieved until 1979, when Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping reached an agreement, including that the USA would cut off its recognition of Taiwan. However, it can’t be denied that Nixon and Kissinger were two frontiermen in a budding US-China relationship.
CONCLUSION
The Ussuri River conflict highlights the cracks in the Chinese-Russian relationship. The fact that Russia still has its nukes installed on its border with China demonstrates that Russia still considers China a threat. The so-called “no limits” partnership between China and Russia is nothing but a marriage of convenience. Both Russia and China need someone to lean on. Russia needs China economically to withstand Western sanctions, while China needs Russia for diplomatic and military support. The biggest loser is the US, which has fallen into its trap of supporting China, fantasising about it as an asset against the Soviet Union. However, China became its own Frankenstein monster. Unfortunately, the US still fails to learn. Through its reckless policies, it is pushing China and Russia closer instead of trying to exploit their differences. If left unattended, the China-Russia nexus will pose a formidable challenge for US policymakers.
