Article 370 was never a mystical shield for Kashmiri identity or a symbol of “internal sovereignty” it was a war‑time, transitional clause that gradually turned into a political glass ceiling for ordinary people in Jammu & Kashmir, and its removal in 2019 followed both constitutional logic and increasingly ground realities.
What Article 370 Actually Was
Article 370 was inserted in Part XXI of the Indian Constitution – explicitly titled “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions” – to govern the relationship between India and the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession during the 1947–48 war.
Under this framework, J&K kept its own constitution, flag and substantial control over internal administration, while India handled defence, foreign affairs and communications, with other Union laws extended to the state only through Presidential Orders issued “in consultation” or “with concurrence” of the state government. Article 35A, introduced in 1954 through a Presidential Order under Article 370, allowed the J&K legislature to define “permanent residents” and reserve key rights like land ownership and government jobs exclusively for them, further entrenching a special regime within the Indian Union.
Why It Was Meant To Be Temporary
The very placement of Article 370 in the “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions” part was not accidental; it reflected the unsettled, war‑time status of J&K in 1949, when ceasefire lines, refugee flows and UN mediation were still shaping the ground situation.
Historically, the clause was designed as an interim arrangement until a J&K Constituent Assembly could negotiate the final terms of integration, after which the President, “on the recommendation of that Constituent Assembly”, could declare Article 370 inoperative. When the state’s Constituent Assembly dissolved itself in 1957 without pronouncing Article 370 permanent, it created constitutional ambiguity that later political forces presented as “permanence”, even though the Supreme Court has now explicitly affirmed that Article 370 was a temporary provision tied to war‑time conditions, not a source of internal sovereignty.
Also Read, Article 370: Law, Propaganda, and Powerplay
How Abrogation Was Done Constitutionally
On 5 August 2019, the President issued Constitutional Order C.O. 272, superseding the 1954 order and extending the entire Indian Constitution to J&K, followed the next day by C.O. 273, which made all clauses of Article 370 except 370(1) inoperative. Critics argued that, because the J&K Constituent Assembly no longer existed, the President could not act under Article 370(3), but the Union’s position was that Parliament could effectively step into that role through an interpretive amendment to Article 367, and that emergency and President’s Rule did not freeze constitutional evolution. In December 2023, a five‑judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Union’s abrogation of Article 370, held that J&K never enjoyed any “internal sovereignty”, affirmed that 370 was temporary, and clarified that the President’s power under 370(3) survives the dissolution of the State’s Constituent Assembly.
Beyond “Occupation” Narratives: Integration vs Disintegration
A key line in the Supreme Court verdict states that the 2019 decision was taken “to enhance constitutional integration and not disintegration”, directly countering the narrative that removing Article 370 was an act of annexation or occupation.
By making all provisions of the Indian Constitution applicable to J&K, the abrogation aligned the region’s rights framework with that of other Indian states including fundamental rights, affirmative action regimes, and national‑level socio‑economic legislation that previously needed separate concurrence from the J&K legislature. The Court also directed that statehood be restored “as soon as possible” and ordered Assembly elections within a prescribed timeframe, reinforcing that constitutional integration is meant to culminate in representative self‑government under the same rules that apply elsewhere in India, not permanent central rule.
What Changed on the Ground After 2019
It is true that the immediate aftermath of August 2019 involved a long internet shutdown, heavy security restrictions and serious economic disruption, particularly to tourism and local businesses, which data show caused major short‑term losses and a spike in unemployment.
However, medium‑term figures paint a different picture: by six years after abrogation, official and journalistic data show a sharp decline in violence, with local militant recruitment reportedly dropping from 129 individuals in 2019 to just 1 in 2025, and a steady fall in terror incidents. On the economic side, Jammu & Kashmir’s GDP is reported to have more than doubled between 2015–16 and 2024–25, while GST collections rose around 12%, excise revenues about 39%, and non‑tax revenues about 25% between 2022 and 2024, alongside a turnaround of J&K Bank from heavy losses to substantial profit.
Land, Demography and the Myth of “Cultural Erasure”
One of the most emotionally charged claims is that abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A opened the floodgates for outsiders to “swamp” Kashmiri Muslims and erase local culture through land purchases and demographic engineering. While legal barriers to non‑resident land ownership have indeed been relaxed, demographic change is in practice constrained by geography, security considerations, market realities, and the political sensitivity of Kashmir, and there is as yet no credible, large‑scale data showing a dramatic population replacement.
Crucially, removal of exclusive permanent‑resident privileges also benefits marginalized communities within J&K – such as women who marry outside the state, Valmiki community members, refugees from Pakistan‑occupied territories, and Gujjar–Bakarwal tribes who previously faced structural discrimination under local rules that could not have survived fundamental‑rights scrutiny elsewhere in India.
Federalism, Asymmetry and the “Special Status” Debate
Pakistani propaganda often suggests that abrogation of Article 370 destroyed Indian federalism by removing a legitimate form of asymmetric autonomy, but constitutional scholarship shows that asymmetry in India has always been conditional and revisable, from special provisions in the Northeast to arrangements in Maharashtra and Gujarat.
Article 370 created not just asymmetry but a veto point:
key national reforms including anti‑corruption laws, social justice schemes and security legislation – depended on local political bargaining which often empowered narrow elites rather than ordinary citizens. By contrast, the post‑2019 framework seeks to normalize J&K’s place in the Union while still allowing future political autonomy through the regular federal tools available to any state: elected government, state‑specific legislation, and negotiated centre–state relations under the broader constitutional umbrella.
Security, Rights and the Cost of Ambiguity
Another under‑discussed aspect is how the long‑term ambiguity around Article 370 contributed to a security environment in which more than 44,000 people – including civilians, security personnel and militants – were killed in insurgency‑related violence up to 2019, according to government‑linked figures cited in academic work. Special status did not prevent radicalization, foreign‑backed militancy or cross‑border infiltration; in fact, the complex constitutional terrain at times hampered uniform application of counter‑terror and criminal law, and created political space for separatist narratives to claim quasi‑sovereign status.
Post‑abrogation, there is evidence of a steady decline in terror incidents and local recruitment, even though Indo‑Pak tensions have remained high and isolated attacks still occur – suggesting that constitutional integration is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for long‑term stabilization.
The Real Debate: Performance, Not Existence
The most productive debate around Article 370 today is not whether its removal was “illegal” – the Supreme Court has settled that question in favour of the Union but whether the Union and future J&K governments can deliver on the promise of peace, dignity and development under a fully applicable Indian Constitution.
While terrorism and cross-border infiltration remain security challenges, the region has also witnessed expanded infrastructure, greater implementation of central welfare schemes, increased tourism, and a gradual return of democratic processes through local elections. These developments suggest that the debate should no longer be confined to constitutional symbolism but should focus on ensuring long-term peace, economic opportunity, and effective governance for the people of Jammu & Kashmir.
Pakistan continues to wage an information campaign portraying the 2019 decision as illegitimate. Yet these efforts have not altered India’s constitutional position, nor have they resulted in broad international recognition of Pakistan’s claims. Instead, Islamabad increasingly faces scrutiny over governance, political rights, and economic conditions in Pakistan occupied territories, including Gilgit-Baltistan.
For decades, Pakistan projected POJK as “Azad Jammu & Kashmir” as a model of self-governance while accusing India of denying rights in Jammu & Kashmir. However, the past two years have witnessed an unprecedented wave of protests across Pakistan- occupied Kashmir, driven by demands for political representation, affordable electricity, control over local resources, and an end to what protesters describe as Islamabad’s interference in regional affairs. The recent crackdown on demonstrators, reported deaths, arrests, and communication restrictions have further intensified scrutiny of Pakistan’s governance in the region.
The change is also visible in the language used by many activists. Increasingly, voices critical of Islamabad have rejected the label “Azad” (Free) Kashmir, arguing that genuine autonomy does not exist under Pakistan’s administrative structure. Some have instead adopted terms such as “Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK)” to underline what they see as the region’s lack of political freedom.
This shift contrasts sharply with the narrative Pakistan has promoted internationally since 2019. While Islamabad continues to campaign against the abrogation of Article 370, it has simultaneously faced growing unrest within the territory under its own illegal occupation. Election-related violence, allegations of political manipulation, and mass protests have increasingly drawn attention to governance issues across the Line of Control.
For India, the anniversary of Article 370 is therefore more than a constitutional milestone it marks a strategic shift in the Kashmir discourse. Rather than debating whether Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India, New Delhi’s focus has increasingly turned toward development, security, democratic participation, and highlighting what it sees as the unresolved issue of Pakistan occupied territories.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi has repeatedly stated in Parliament, the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir issue remains incomplete until Pakistan vacates the territories under its control. Whether that objective is achieved through diplomacy, changing geopolitical realities, or future negotiations remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that from India’s standpoint, the debate has moved beyond Article 370. The next chapter is no longer about constitutional integration it is about the future of Pakistan occupied Jammu & Kashmir.
