In today’s geopolitical environment, controlling the narrative has become almost as important as controlling territory. Over the past year, Pakistan appears to have made a consistent effort to reshape its global image through coordinated messaging across defence, energy, and economic sectors. What stands out is not just the claims themselves, but the platforms used to spread them, especially global wire services like Reuters, which can quickly amplify these stories worldwide.
This pattern reflects a form of narrative strategy and funding from state actors where selective claims often based on unnamed or anonymous sources are introduced into the global information space and gradually gain credibility through repetition.
The Export Mirage: Analysing the 2026 Procurement Flurry
From 2024, and more sharply in January 2026, a series of reports many attributed to Reuters journalist Saad Sayeed and others projected a wave of multi-billion-dollar defence deals for Pakistan. These reports suggested that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Libya, and Sudan were either in advanced talks or close to finalising major purchases of the JF-17 and related systems.
According to Reuters reporting, Pakistan was engaged in discussions with multiple countries, with several deals described as being in “advanced stages,” largely driven by the aircraft’s “combat-tested” positioning following the 2025 conflict.
A closer look at these reports shows a consistent pattern: heavy reliance on unnamed or anonymous sources, along with a tendency for one report to reinforce another creating what appears to be a self-reinforcing information loop rather than independently verified
Timeline of Narrative Formation (2024–2026)
A chronological reading of reporting between 2024 and early 2026 reveals a clear transformation: what began as a single confirmed export deal gradually evolved into a broader perception of sustained global demand for Pakistan’s defence platforms, particularly the JF-17. This shift was not linear, but driven by a combination of real developments, post-conflict positioning, and repeated media amplification.
September 2024 Initial Export Breakthrough
The first concrete milestone in this sequence was Pakistan’s agreement to supply JF-17 Block III fighter jets to Azerbaijan, marking one of the country’s most significant modern defence exports. At the time, the deal was notable but limited in scope. It represented a successful bilateral transaction rather than evidence of broader market penetration. The JF-17 remained positioned as a cost-effective alternative in the lower-to-mid segment of the global fighter market, competing primarily on affordability and accessibility rather than technological superiority.
However, this agreement would later serve as a reference point frequently cited in subsequent reporting to support the idea of expanding international demand.
Emergence of the “Combat-Tested” Narrative
Following the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, the framing of the JF-17 began to shift. Reporting increasingly emphasised the operational deployment of Pakistani aircraft, particularly those equipped with Chinese-origin systems such as advanced radar and beyond-visual-range missiles. The aircraft started being described as “combat-tested,” a designation that carries disproportionate weight in defence procurement discussions. In practical terms, this label functions as a force multiplier in perception, often elevating a platform’s attractiveness beyond its technical specifications.
At this stage, a critical transition occurred: the aircraft was no longer being evaluated purely on capability or cost, but on perceived battlefield validation. This reframing laid the groundwork for subsequent claims of rising export interest.
October 2025 Entry of Competing Operational Narratives
As post-conflict reporting expanded, the information environment became increasingly contested. Pakistani narratives highlighted fake operational success and the effectiveness of their air combat systems, while Indian officials presented counter-claims, stating that multiple Pakistani aircraft had been shot down during the same engagements.
This marked the emergence of a Pakistani narrative ecosystem, where Pakistan used fake battlefield outcomes and became subject to competing interpretations. In such an environment, perception begins to diverge from verifiable reality, and media reporting plays a central role in shaping external understanding.
December 2025 Expansion into High-Value Deal Narratives
By late 2025, the focus of reporting shifted from operational performance to large-scale defence agreements. One of the most prominent examples was the reported multi-billion-dollar deal between Pakistan and Libya’s eastern-based forces, involving aircraft and other military systems. Libya remained under a United Nations arms embargo, raising immediate legal and logistical questions regarding the feasibility of such transfers. Additionally, the reporting relied heavily on unnamed sources, with limited official confirmation.
The pattern here is significant: as the scale of reported deals increased, the clarity and verifiability of details appeared to decrease.
January 2026 Rapid Expansion Across Multiple Regions
In early January 2026, reporting entered a phase of rapid expansion, with multiple potential deals emerging almost simultaneously across different regions.Pakistan was reported to be engaging in defence discussions with Bangladesh, including a possible JF-17 sale and broader military cooperation. At the same time, talks with Saudi Arabia reportedly involved converting financial loans into defence agreements, while Sudan and Indonesia were linked to potential multi-billion-dollar packages involving aircraft and drones. The clustering of these reports created the impression of a coordinated surge in demand. However, across these cases, several common characteristics persisted:
- reliance on anonymous, self cited or unofficial sources
- absence of signed contracts or delivery frameworks
- use of terms such as “talks,” “interest,” or “advanced stages” rather than confirmed agreements
January 20, 2026 Narrative Consolidation
A key Reuters report consolidated these developments into a single narrative, portraying Pakistan as being in talks with 13 countries and framing 6 to 8 negotiations as “advanced,” largely driven by the “combat-tested” narrative. However, Pakistan’s military and defence ministry provided no details of any confirmed agreements. Even the defence production minister limited his statement to saying that “several countries were interested” in acquiring jets and related systems highlighting the gap between reported momentum and verifiable contracts.
Across this timeline, a clear pattern emerges:
- A single verified deal (Azerbaijan)
- followed by narrative enhancement (“combat-tested”)
- followed by contested operational claims
- followed by rapid expansion of reported deals
- culminating in a consolidated perception of widespread demand
Saudi Arabia: The Debt-for-Jets Construct
One of the most widely discussed claims emerged in January 2026, when Reuters reported that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were in talks to convert around $2 billion in Saudi loans into a JF-17 purchase agreement, with the overall deal potentially reaching $4 billion when additional equipment was included. The broader narrative suggested that Saudi Arabia, looking to diversify away from the United States and build on its 2025 defence agreement with Pakistan, was considering the JF-17 as a strategic addition to its air force.
The Reality
In practice, the Royal Saudi Air Force already operates a highly advanced fleet, including F-15 variants, Eurofighter Typhoons, and Tornado aircraft. Introducing a lightweight fighter with Chinese-origin systems into this ecosystem would raise integration, logistics, and interoperability challenges. Analysts have also noted that such a move could complicate Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to acquire platforms like the F-35, given longstanding U.S. concerns over the integration of Chinese-origin defence technology. At the same time, even within Pakistan, there appeared to be uncertainty. Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated it was “unaware” of any such deal being finalised, highlighting the gap between reported negotiations and confirmed agreements.
As a result, the reported “interest” may be better understood as exploratory or political signalling, rather than a confirmed procurement decision.
Libya and Sudan: Embargoes and Legal Constraints
The reports involving Libya and Sudan raise more serious concerns from an international law perspective. In December 2025, it was reported that Pakistan had finalised a $4 billion deal with the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) for JF-17 fighter jets and related equipment.
The Reality
Libya has been under a United Nations arms embargo since 2011, imposed through Security Council Resolution 1970, which prohibits the direct or indirect supply of arms and military equipment without explicit UN approval. This embargo remains in force and has been repeatedly renewed, with member states required to prevent the transfer of weapons into the country. In this context, any transfer of advanced fighter aircraft would require clearance from the UN sanctions committee making such a deal highly unlikely in practical terms. The financial viability of such a transaction also remains unclear, as the LNA does not possess the sovereign financial capacity typically required for a multi-billion-dollar procurement.
Similarly, reports of a $1.5 billion deal with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) emerge in the middle of an ongoing civil war and a severe humanitarian crisis. Sudan remains under significant international scrutiny, with ongoing conflict drawing global attention and pressure against external military support. Any large-scale transfer of advanced weapon systems into an active conflict zone would likely face diplomatic and sanctions-related challenges, particularly from Western states and multilateral institutions.
Bangladesh and Indonesia: The Pivot Narrative
The cases of Bangladesh and Indonesia have been used to suggest a broader shift in regional alignments. In early 2026, a Reuters report indicated that Bangladesh was exploring a defence partnership with Pakistan that could include the potential acquisition of JF-17 fighter jets.
The broader narrative presents this as a strategic “tilt” away from India, with Bangladesh allegedly moving closer to Pakistan and China by considering the JF-17 as a primary multirole fighter.
The Reality
In practice, Bangladesh’s procurement strategy remains diversified. In December 2025, the Bangladesh Air Force signed a Letter of Intent with Italy’s Leonardo for theEurofighter Typhoon, indicating parallel engagement with Western suppliers.
Indonesia: Diversification, Not Alignment
In Indonesia’s case, report of a potential deal involving around 40 JF-17 aircraft and drones emerged in early 2026. However, officials described these discussions as preliminary and exploratory rather than finalised agreements.
The Reality
Indonesia has already committed to multiple high-value defence procurements from other partners. These include:
- A multi-billion-dollar deal for up to 42 Rafale fighter jets from France, with deliveries already underway
- A contract for 48 KAAN fifth-generation fighter jets from Turkey
- Ongoing or previously considered discussions involving U.S. platforms such as the F-15EX
This reflects a broader strategy of diversification rather than alignment with any single supplier. Given the scale and complexity of these existing commitments, the addition of another fighter platform like the JF-17 would introduce logistical and operational challenges, making finalisation of such a deal uncertain.
The IMF Constraint
The projection of defence export growth in 2026 cannot be analysed in isolation; it must be situated within Pakistan’s broader macroeconomic position under ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation programmes.
Pakistan remains engaged in a multi-year IMF framework designed to restore macroeconomic stability, strengthen external buffers, and enforce fiscal discipline. In March 2026, a staff-level agreement was reached that could unlock approximately $1.2 billion in funding, subject to executive board approval, as part of its broader $7 billion programme. While IMF assessments have acknowledged improvements in key indicators including inflation moderation, fiscal consolidation, and a rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves the programme continues to emphasise structural vulnerabilities. These include exposure to external shocks, dependence on energy imports, and the need for sustained policy discipline.
Ongoing review discussions in 2026 further underline that Pakistan’s economic trajectory remains contingent on external financing and global conditions, particularly in the context of regional instability and rising energy prices. Within this framework, narratives surrounding defence exports emerge not merely as industrial developments, but as signals embedded within a constrained macroeconomic environment.
The Export Revenue Narrative
Against this backdrop, projections by Pakistani defence officials have suggested that potential JF-17 export agreements could generate up to $13 billion in revenue. Framed at face value, such figures imply the emergence of a significant alternative source of foreign exchange capable of reducing reliance on IMF support and external borrowing.
However, the structure of defence contracts complicates this interpretation. Large-scale military agreements are rarely realised as immediate cash inflows; instead, they are typically distributed over multi-year timelines, often extending across five to ten years. Payments are phased, conditional, and frequently tied to delivery milestones, training packages, and maintenance agreements.
In addition, the JF-17 programme operates within a transnational supply chain. Pakistan sources critical subsystems including engines, avionics, and radar components externally, particularly from China. As a result, upstream procurement costs offset a significant portion of export revenue, reducing the net foreign exchange retained domestically. Consequently, headline defence export figures reflect aggregate contract values rather than immediate or fully realisable financial gains. This distinction is essential when evaluating claims that such exports could materially alter Pakistan’s external financing position.
Economic Positioning
Within an IMF-supported framework, the promotion of defence exports can be understood less as pure commercial expansion and more as strategic signalling. The visibility of prospective deals projects industrial capability externally while reinforcing a narrative of recovery domestically. In this context, the JF-17 functions not only as a military platform but as a symbolic indicator of economic momentum, particularly through its “combat-tested” positioning.
Pakistani defense officials have claimed that potential JF-17 deals could generate up to $13 billion, boosting foreign reserves by 82%. Pakistan’s external debt stands at approximately $138 billion as. The foreign reserves, while rebuilding to $10.3 billion in April 2026, remain thin. Even if the $13 billion figure proves accurate, these contracts typically span 5–10 years and include significant “technology transfer” and “local assembly” components that reduce immediate hard-currency inflows to Islamabad. Furthermore, Pakistan must allocate a substantial share of the revenue to China for engines, avionics, and radar systems that it does not produce domestically.
The divergence between India and Pakistan reflects structural differences in economic resilience. India benefits from scale, diversification, and stronger external buffers, while Pakistan continues to rely on fiscal consolidation and external financing under IMF oversight. Although stabilisation has progressed, assessments indicate that Pakistan’s recovery remains contingent and vulnerable to external shocks.
Second-Order Risks
The gap between projected outcomes and verifiable developments carries broader risks. Prematurely announcing deals with nations like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, Pakistan risks a “boy who cried wolf” effect. When these deals fail to materialize or are officially denied by the partner nations, the credibility of Pakistani defense production is further eroded, making it harder to secure genuine customers Claiming multi-billion-dollar deals with nations under UN embargo (Libya) or in active civil war (Sudan) creates significant friction with the international community. It portrays Pakistan as a “spoiler” in international stabilization efforts, which could complicate its standing with the FATF or the UN Security Council
The Integrated Narrative
The defence export push aligns with parallel narratives in energy and economic policy, together projecting resilience and forward movement. Disseminated through global media platforms, these narratives benefit from early visibility, allowing perception to form faster than verification shaping discourse even where underlying realities remain uncertain.
Energy Geopolitics: The Hormuz Narratives
A narrative has been pushed, primarily through platforms like “Energy Tracker Asia” and the “Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA),” suggesting that Pakistan has emerged as a regional leader in energy resilience due to a “people-led solar boom and Pakistan has avoided over $12 billion in fossil fuel imports between 2021 and 2026 by rapidly shifting to solar, shielding its economy from the Hormuz crisis while regional peers like India and Japan suffer from massive price shocks and supply shortages.
The Reality
While it is true that Pakistan has imported over 51 GW of solar panels since 2018, this “boom” is a symptom of a failing national grid rather than a strategic success. High electricity prices (increasing up to 200%) and unreliable supply (up to 18-hour blackouts in rural areas) have forced citizens and industries to go “off-grid” to survive. As of April 2026, the Pakistani government has officially announced rolling power cuts of two hours and 15 minutes every evening during peak hours (5 PM to 1 AM) to manage demand and avoid the use of prohibitively expensive imported furnace oil.
In Rawalpindi, the gap between official policy and local experience is widening. Residents in areas like Saddar, Adiala Road, and the inner city are reporting 4 to 8 hours of daily outages, significantly exceeding the official 135-minute evening window. Furthermore, the power sector’s “circular debt” the chronic shortfall in payments that prevents the system from functioning, reached Rs 1.8 trillion by February 2026. Despite capital injections, the debt grew by Rs 75 billion in the first half of FY26 alone. The “solar success” is thus a private sector coping mechanism for a public sector failure.
The 2026 crisis, triggered by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, affected a significant share of global energy supply, forcing major import-dependent economies to activate contingency strategies. In this context, India’s response has been shaped by structural capacity and diversification.
India entered the crisis with an installed power capacity exceeding 520 GW, with power shortages declining to just 0.03% by late 2025. This reflects a system that has transitioned from deficit conditions to near supply stability. In parallel, India expanded alternative crude sourcing, reducing dependence on Hormuz-linked routes and maintaining continuity in fuel supply. As a result, there were no widespread disruptions in petrol, diesel, or aviation fuel availability. Limited purchases from alternative suppliers, including Iran, appear to have been tactical rather than reactive, aimed at maintaining buffer reserves rather than addressing immediate shortages.
