From Doklam to Galwan: How India Changed the Rules on the LAC

Doklam Standoff: An All-Round Border Skirmish Around Trijunction

On 16 June 2017, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) construction crews entered Doklam, a plateau claimed by Bhutan but also claimed by China, and began building a motorable road from Doka La (in Tibet) toward the Zompelri Ridge. This was a direct violation of Bhutan-China agreements (1988 & 1998) to maintain the status quo in disputed areas.

Bhutan lodged a formal protest against China via its embassy in New Delhi on 20 June 2017, asserting that the construction was happening on Bhutanese territory.

In response, India intervened militarily on Bhutan’s behalf. On 18 June 2017, Indian Army troops crossed over from Sikkim and physically blocked the PLA construction party, forming human chains to prevent further progress. No shots were fired, but for the next 73 days, Indian and Chinese troops stood in a tense face-off.

Strategic Geography and the Crisis

Doklam is an 89 sq km plateau claimed by China but administered by Bhutan. Located near the Siliguri Corridor—India’s strategic “Chicken’s Neck” –  a 17–22 km wide strip that connects India’s northeast to the mainland — control over this region holds immense tactical value. China’s attempt to build a road toward Zompelri Ridge in June 2017 was perceived by India as a direct security threat.

India, honoring its 2007 security pact with Bhutan, deployed troops to block the construction. For over two months, both militaries remained stationed a few meters apart in a high-altitude face-off without a single shot fired.

The Sino-Bhutanese Border Settlements –  From ‘65 War to Doklam

1962 Onward: India-China War and Bhutan’s Strategic Shift

The 1962 war between India and China deeply influenced Bhutan’s security posture. Watching a full-scale border conflict unfold on its doorstep, Bhutan grew increasingly anxious about its undefended northern frontier, particularly as Chinese control over Tibet tightened. In response to growing incursions, Bhutan raised its concerns at the United Nations, marking a rare international assertion of its territorial integrity. That same year, India began deploying troops near sensitive tri-junction zones, including Chumbi Valley and Doklam. These areas not only bordered Bhutan, but also held critical strategic value for India. From that point onward, Bhutan steadily strengthened its security relationship with India, relying on New Delhi for both diplomatic backing and military deterrence.

1984–1998: Bhutan-China Border Talks and India’s Strategic Vigilance

By 1984, Bhutan initiated its first formal border negotiations with China—a cautious step taken with India’s tacit approval. While India wasn’t directly involved in the talks, it remained closely informed and actively consulted throughout. The negotiations focused on two key disputed areas: the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north, and the Doklam plateau in the west. Together, these regions account for over 580 square kilometers of contested land. As of 2024, 24 rounds of border talks have taken place. India’s proximity to the disputes, especially Doklam’s location near the Siliguri Corridor, has made it an unofficial but essential stakeholder. Through strategic consultations and intelligence coordination, India has remained deeply embedded in Bhutan’s border diplomacy, ensuring its own security interests are not compromised.

1996–1998: The Package Deal Dilemma and India’s Intervention

In the late 1990s, China presented Bhutan with a “package deal” that would have significant strategic consequences. Beijing proposed that Bhutan relinquish claims to the western Doklam plateau in exchange for China recognizing Bhutanese control over the northern valleys – Jakarlung and Pasamlung with an overall disputed area of 495 sqkm. Although the offer appeared balanced on paper, India immediately raised alarm bells. From New Delhi’s perspective, conceding Doklam to China would have brought the PLA perilously close to the Siliguri Corridor. 

India strongly advised Bhutan against accepting the offer, emphasizing the potential long-term risk. Ultimately, Bhutan chose to reject the deal, and in 1998 signed an Agreement for Peace and Tranquility with China. The agreement committed both nations to maintain the status quo and resolve disputes peacefully—aligning with India’s security concerns.

2007: Upgraded Indo-Bhutan Treaty and a Reinforced Alliance

India and Bhutan revised their longstanding 1949 Friendship Treaty in 2007 to reflect a more equal and modern partnership. The updated treaty reaffirmed Bhutan’s sovereign right to conduct its foreign policy, but it also preserved a crucial clause requiring both countries to consult each other on matters of mutual security. This clause solidified India’s strategic role in Bhutan’s defense planning—particularly in contested border areas like Doklam.

The treaty laid the legal and diplomatic foundation for India’s involvement during the 2017 Doklam standoff, when Indian troops physically intervened to halt Chinese road construction that threatened Bhutanese territory. Far from being a unilateral act, India’s response was built on years of trust, shared interests, and a mutual commitment to regional stability.

China’s Psychological Warfare and India’s Restraint

China unleashed a fierce propaganda campaign, issuing war threats and disparaging India through state-run outlets like Global Times and PLA Daily. The messaging was aggressive, accusing India of “illegal trespass” and warning of a “bitter lesson.”

India, however, refrained from retaliatory rhetoric. Instead, it maintained diplomatic channels and projected strategic calm. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar and the then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj led a measured response, focusing on de-escalation.

Bhutan, though militarily weak, played a pivotal role by officially protesting China’s actions and reaffirming the disputed status of Doklam, thereby countering China’s narrative that Bhutan had acquiesced.

Geopolitical Fallout and Realignment

The standoff reshaped India’s strategic calculus. Recognizing China’s assertiveness, New Delhi deepened ties with the US, Japan, and Australia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) gained momentum, with India embracing a multilateral approach to balance China’s Indo-Pacific influence.

On 28 August 2017, after 13 rounds of diplomatic negotiations and rising global scrutiny, both sides agreed to a mutual disengagement. India withdrew troops, and China halted road construction, giving India a tactical and diplomatic win.

Galwan Clash – Armless, Not At All Harmless

The clash took place on June 15, 2020, in the high-altitude terrain of the Galwan Valley, located in eastern Ladakh near the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—the de facto border between India and China. The valley lies along the Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road, a critical supply route for the Indian military leading to the Karakoram Pass.

Why is the DSDBO Road Significant to India

1. Strategic Location: A Lifeline to the Karakoram

• The DSDBO road runs parallel to the LAC, in an area where China has built robust infrastructure on its side of the border.
  
• It provides direct access to the DBO airstrip, one of the world’s highest and most remote airfields, located at 16,600 feet.
  
• This airfield is just a few kilometers from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Aksai Chin, which China occupies but India claims.
  

2. Countering Chinese Military Mobility

• China has long enjoyed superior border infrastructure along the LAC, with well-developed roads and railway lines in Tibet.
  
• The DSDBO road narrowed that infrastructure gap, enabling mirror deployment by India in contested sectors like Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, and Burtse.
  
• The road runs close to the Galwan Valley—the flashpoint of the 2020 clash—and allows India to hold key heights and dominate passes like the Chang Chenmo corridor.
  

As former Indian Army Northern Command chief Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda noted:

“The road enhances India’s tactical flexibility and deterrence, forcing the PLA to factor in rapid Indian response.”

3. Catalyst Behind the 2020 Galwan Clash

Many analysts believe the DSDBO road was one of the key reasons behind China’s 2020 aggression in eastern Ladakh. China likely viewed the improved Indian access to DBO and Galwan as a strategic threat to its control over Aksai Chin and proximity to CPEC.

• By constructing a feeder road from the DSDBO route to the Patrolling Point 14 (PP14) in Galwan, India effectively challenged Chinese perception of the LAC.
  
• The PLA’s incursions and the violent Galwan clash of June 15, 2020, may have been a preemptive move to limit India’s tactical advantage stemming from the new road.

4. Part of a Broader Infrastructure Push

The DSDBO road is part of India’s broader strategy to enhance border connectivity. In 2006, the Cabinet Committee on Security cleared 73 roads of strategic importance along the China border.

• DSDBO is Road No. 3, managed by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).
  
• The BRO has since upgraded it with new bridges, tunnels, and blacktopped surfaces.
  
• In 2023, the India-China Corps Commander meetings at Chushul-Moldo included discussions on road access points and India’s refusal to scale down construction near DSDBO.

5. Symbol of India’s Strategic Assertiveness

The completion and usage of the DSDBO road symbolize a shift in Indian border policy:

• From “let infrastructure lag behind” to “develop to deter.”
  
• From passive monitoring to active area dominance.
  
• It reinforces India’s claim over Ladakh and demonstrates the will to hold ground in high-friction zones.
  

The road also supports civilian settlements, communication, and limited tourism in northern Ladakh, aiding economic integration of frontier regions like Nyoma, Tangtse, and Durbuk.

Damage by the “Differing Perceptions” around LAC

What was the common doctrine?

Since the 1990s, India and China have invoked “differing perceptions” of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to explain occasional transgressions. That meant that troops from both sides sometimes patrolled based on their own maps—leading to unintentional overlaps, which were dismissed as administrative errors, not strategic moves.

Why did India drop this approach?

• Loss of territory: Analysts and veterans argue that labeling incursions as “differing perceptions” allowed China to gradually chip away at Indian-held land, a classic salami slicing strategy, as discussed in an article by Scroll as well.
  
• Galwan’s turning point: India recognized that labeling the Galwan intrusion as a mere oversight would misrepresent China’s intentions. Former Ambassador Niraj Srivastava noted that the clash “shows that India has discarded the ‘differing perceptions’ theory,” asserting that China was deliberately shifting the status quo

At the Cost of Lives

India and China have signed multiple confidence-building agreements, notably:

• 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures
  
• 2005 Protocol on Border Management

These agreements prohibit the use of firearms, explosives, and aggressive military postures within 2 km of the LAC. As a result, when physical confrontations occur, troops engage without firearms, resorting to rudimentary or improvised weapons.

A report by India Today  cited intelligence sources confirming that the Chinese side brought “Guandao-style rods” (traditional polearms) modified with steel-studded heads. Both sides reportedly threw stones and boulders, some of which caused head trauma and blunt injuries. Some Chinese soldiers were reported to have carried metal knuckle-dusters, similar to those used in riot control, enhancing the force of hand-to-hand combat.

India officially confirmed the supreme sacrifice of 20 soldiers, including commanding officer Col. Santosh Babu. Chinese sources acknowledged 4 deaths, though U.S. intelligence and independent estimates suggest up to 35–45 Chinese casualties. Importantly, this incident was the deadliest India-China border clash since 1967. 

Diplomatic and Economic Countermeasures

Simultaneously, India imposed sweeping non-military sanctions targeting Chinese interests. In late June 2020, the government banned 59 predominantly Chinese mobile apps, citing security concerns tied to the border clash. Over time, this ban expanded—by late 2022, around 300 apps were blocked, including offerings from Tencent and Alibaba. Investments from Chinese firms faced fresh scrutiny; more stringent vetting rules and freezing of significant assets—such as over $600 million belonging to Xiaomi—reconfigured economic ties. Additionally, direct passenger flights and visa issuance were halted, signaling a broader decoupling of bilateral relations.

Defensive Realignment: Mirror Deployment & High-Tech Surveillance

On the ground, India adopted a “mirror deployment” doctrine—positioning troops, tanks, and artillery in symmetry to Chinese forward forces. Forward posts near the LAC were fortified and equipped with enhanced night-vision, drones, and surveillance gear, transforming them into rugged yet alert defensive strongpoints . Strategic infrastructure, including the Darbuk–Shyok–DBO road and airfields like Daulat Beg Oldi, facilitated rapid mobilization and logistical sustainment, making northern Ladakh a hardened bulwark against future incursions.

Strengthened Alliances and Strategic Cooperation

India’s diplomatic recalibration post-Galwan extended beyond immediate military measures. It intensified cooperation with Quad partners (the U.S., Japan, and Australia), sealing logistics-sharing agreements like the ACSA (with the U.S.) and MLSA (with Australia and Japan). These pacts enabled cross-servicing and intelligence collaboration, signaling India’s broader alignment within an Indo-Pacific security architecture designed to counterbalance Chinese ambitions. Furthermore, India expedited its participation in geospatial-data cooperation via BECA, bolstering military-mapping capacity—while infrastructure projects like Project Zorawar, a domestically developed light tank, targeted the PLA’s Type-15 advantage in high-altitude warfare.

No Wars, Strong Warnings 

India effectively prevented two potential wars—first at Doklam in 2017 and then at Galwan in 2020—but the contexts and dynamics of each were different.

At Doklam, India intervened preemptively to block Chinese road construction in Bhutanese-claimed territory, near the sensitive India-China-Bhutan tri-junction. This move upheld the status quo and protected India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor without a single shot being fired, showcasing India’s willingness to act on behalf of a regional ally. This was a direct hit to the Hexiao Gongda policy that it has try to lure Bhutan in – which the Indian and  Bhutanese diplomats have countered sternly.

Galwan, by contrast, was a direct intrusion into Indian-claimed territory. China likely saw Galwan as an opportunity to undo the psychological setback it suffered at Doklam and to test India’s resolve. It was also timed amid global distraction during the COVID-19 pandemic and followed India’s growing infrastructure development and deepening ties with the U.S. and Quad partners. The violent hand-to-hand clash in Galwan, which resulted in casualties on both sides, marked a sharp escalation.

While Doklam was about denying China a tactical gain through a show of strength and diplomacy, Galwan was about defending India’s sovereignty through force and strategic reorientation.

Conclusion

The message is unambiguous: India will not yield an inch to coercion, propaganda, or grey-zone tactics. It has redefined the narrative—from being reactive to being resilient; from defensive silence to decisive signaling. What began as border tensions has evolved into a doctrine of deterrence that now shapes the contours of South Asian security and beyond.