The Drone-Proof Tank: Can India’s Armoured Formations Survive the Age of Drone Warfare?

The battlefield is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The tank, once considered the dominant symbol of ground combat power, is now facing an increasingly persistent threat from an inexpensive weapon: the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

The most important recent procurement developments

Three developments give your proposed programme a strong factual foundation.

3 July 2026 — DAC approval

The Defence Acquisition Council granted AoN for the Army’s AKASH TARANG anti-UAV electronic warfare system and an Active Protection System for tanks. AKASH TARANG is intended to provide anti-UAV protection to Army formations.

21 October 2026 — BEL radar contract

The Ministry of Defence signed a ₹770 crore contract with BEL for Improved Low Level Light Weight Radars, with mini/micro-drone detection capability.

26 October 2026 — Platform-based C-UAS AoN

DAC granted AoN for Platform Based C-UAS. The PIB announcement specifically states that the system will enhance tank survivability.

These are three different procurement milestones. An AoN is not a signed contract, and the October approval does not establish which company will win the platform-based C-UAS competition.

How do we make tanks and armoured formations survivable in a battlefield saturated with hostile drones?

A significant development for T-72 and T-90 protection

India has recognised this emerging vulnerability and has taken specific steps towards protecting its armoured fleet.

One of the most significant developments was the Indian Army’s reported April 2025 requirement for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) for its T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks.

According to a report by The Tribune dated 7 April 2025, the Army planned an initial procurement of 75 systems for retrofitting onto these tanks, with a projected implementation period of 36 months.

The reported requirement highlighted an important operational concern: anti-tank threats are no longer restricted to the frontal arc. Unmanned aerial threats can approach from multiple directions, including above the vehicle.

This is a major change in the philosophy of armoured vehicle protection.

DRDO’s Active Protection System

At Aero India 2025, DRDO officials disclosed a new hard-kill Active Protection System (APS) under development for integration with main battle tanks.

The proposed system includes:

• Four X-band radar units.
• Two traversable countermeasure launchers.
• Two anti-threat munitions per launcher.
• Radar coverage intended to provide 360-degree surveillance.
• A hemispherical engagement architecture.

The system is designed to detect and counter conventional anti-armour threats, including anti-tank guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

An especially interesting detail is that DRDO officials also indicated the system could detect small and micro UAVs at approximately 2 km.

This is an important technological development. It suggests that tank-mounted active protection architecture could contribute to the detection of small airborne threats, although detecting a drone and reliably defeating it are two different capabilities.

India’s T-90 APS requirement

In a further development, the Indian Army issued an RFI for an Active Protection System for T-90S/SK Bhishma tanks.

The requirement specifically included:

• Soft-kill protection against anti-tank guided missiles and UAVs.
• Hard-kill protection against specified chemical-energy and kinetic-energy threats.
• Counter-UAS capability.
• Modular integration without compromising existing tank capabilities.

The requirement is particularly significant because it explicitly identifies counter-UAS protection as part of the tank’s self-protection architecture.

This is not simply an air-defence requirement. It is a move towards integrating protection against aerial threats into the tank itself.

AKASH TARANG: Protection beyond an individual tank

On 3 July 2026, India’s Defence Acquisition Council accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the procurement of the Army’s Anti-UAV Electronic Warfare System, AKASH TARANG.

The Ministry of Defence stated that the system would provide effective anti-UAV protection to Army formations.

The same announcement also included AoN for an Active Protection System for tanks.

The significance lies in the parallel development of two complementary capabilities:

• Tank-level active protection.
• Formation-level anti-UAV electronic warfare protection.

This distinction matters. A tank-mounted system protects an individual vehicle within its engagement envelope, while formation-level counter-UAS protection can provide a wider defensive umbrella.

India’s future mechanised formations will need both.

Bhargavastra: India’s counter-swarm development

Another interesting Indian development is Bhargavastra, developed by Solar Defence and Aerospace Ltd.

The system is designed to counter weaponised drones, loitering munitions and drone swarms using a vehicle-mounted, multi-layered hard-kill architecture.

In July 2026, the company demonstrated the system to an Indian Army team under its Make-II development programme.

Reported features include:

• A vehicle-mounted launcher.
• Unguided micro-rockets for swarm threats.
• Precision-guided micro-missiles for other aerial threats.
• Radar, EO/IR and passive RF sensing.
• Integrated command, control and target assignment.

The July demonstration reportedly included live drone detection and tracking. However, the published account stated that live rocket firing was not conducted during that demonstration.

Bhargavastra is particularly relevant because it illustrates the potential of a mobile counter-swarm defence layer accompanying armoured formations.

It should not, however, be confused with a tank-integrated APS. It is a mobile air-defence concept, intended to protect a wider area or formation rather than provide an individual tank with its own hard-kill protection.

What should an effective tank counter-drone protection system look like?

A modern tank cannot rely on a single jammer, a protective cage or a conventional active protection system.

It requires a layered architecture.

Layer 1 – Early warning and detection

Compact radar, RF detection and electro-optical/infrared sensors should provide the crew with early warning of approaching aerial threats.

The challenge is detecting small drones against cluttered backgrounds and distinguishing hostile drones from friendly UAVs.

Layer 2 – Electronic protection

Electronic warfare systems should detect and, where appropriate, disrupt hostile control links and satellite-navigation signals.

However, the system must account for autonomous drones and fibre-optic-controlled platforms, which may not be defeated by conventional RF jamming.

Layer 3 – Hard-kill protection

Where electronic defeat is ineffective, the vehicle or supporting air-defence system requires a physical means of neutralising the threat.

Potential solutions include programmable airburst ammunition, specialised interceptor systems and directed-energy weapons, subject to range, safety and engagement constraints.

Layer 4 – Passive protection

Physical protection remains relevant.

Protective overhead structures, mesh arrangements and improved roof protection can reduce vulnerability to certain attack profiles. However, these measures cannot guarantee protection against all drone threats and may affect visibility, mobility and crew access.

Layer 5 – Formation-level protection

This is perhaps the most important requirement.

A mechanised formation should not depend entirely on individual tanks defending themselves. Supporting counter-UAS vehicles, mobile air-defence systems, electronic warfare platforms and networked sensors should provide overlapping protection.

The objective is to create a defensive network rather than isolated defensive vehicles.

The technical challenges: Why this is not an easy engineering problem

The integration of counter-drone technology into tanks and armoured vehicles involves several difficult engineering considerations.

360-degree and overhead coverage: Traditional tank protection systems are not necessarily optimised for small drones approaching from steep angles or directly overhead.

Detection and classification: Small drones have limited radar signatures, and battlefield clutter can produce false alarms.

Reaction time: FPV drones can approach rapidly. Detection, classification, threat assessment and countermeasure activation must happen within a short engagement window.

Electronic warfare resilience: Autonomous and fibre-optic-controlled drones complicate the use of conventional jammers.

Power and thermal management: Radar, electronic warfare equipment, computing systems and directed-energy weapons require electrical power and cooling capacity.

Electromagnetic compatibility: A vehicle’s counter-UAS equipment must not interfere with its own communications, navigation, weapon systems or friendly platforms.

Cost exchange: Destroying a relatively inexpensive drone with an expensive missile is not always economically sustainable. The choice of countermeasure must be proportionate to the threat.

Friendly-force safety: Hard-kill countermeasures and airburst ammunition must operate without endangering accompanying infantry, friendly UAVs or neighbouring vehicles.

These considerations explain why layered protection is more practical than expecting a single system to defeat every type of drone.

What India should consider next…?

India has several important building blocks: DRDO’s tank APS development, the Army’s T-90 C-UAS requirement, AKASH TARANG, mobile counter-drone systems and the Bhargavastra counter-swarm programme.

The next step should be to integrate these capabilities into a coherent protection architecture for mechanised formations.

A possible framework could include:

• Individual tank-mounted threat detection and self-protection.
• Dedicated mobile counter-UAS vehicles accompanying armoured units.
• Networked radar, EO/IR and RF sensors.
• Electronic warfare support.
• Hard-kill capability against threats that cannot be defeated electronically.
• Integration with the Army’s wider air-defence and battlefield command networks.

Indian defence manufacturers should also examine modular retrofit solutions for existing T-72, T-90, BMP-series and other armoured platforms, while ensuring that new-generation vehicles are designed with counter-UAS integration from the outset.

The challenge is not merely to install more equipment on a tank. It is to create a coordinated defensive ecosystem that preserves mobility, firepower, situational awareness and operational endurance.

Who is supplying what — and who could compete?

In May 2026, Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited (AVNL) through Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF), Avadi, invited Indian companies to partner in developing an integrated drone system for its Main Battle Tank.

The EOI specifies three drone subsystems:

The system is intended to have a common crew display and control interface. It must also withstand tank recoil, turret movement and deep-fording requirements.

Scale of the proposed programme:

• Three prototype sets initially.
• A reported 590 sets for subsequent series production, conditional on the Army selecting the AVNL MBT for the Future Ready Combat Vehicle programme.
• Indian companies are eligible to participate under the Buy (Indian-IDDM) approach.

What the Indian Army is already doing

The Shaurya Squadrons are important here.

In March 2026, the Army demonstrated Shaurya drone squadrons operating with armoured formations during Exercise Amogh Jwala. Reporting identified T-90, T-72 and Arjun tank formations as beneficiaries of this approach.

Their intended capabilities include surveillance, reconnaissance, FPV operations, swarm drones and precision strikes.

But there is an important distinction:

• Shaurya Squadrons mean drones are organised and operated alongside tank regiments.
• AVNL’s EOI seeks to integrate drone subsystems directly into the tank platform.

The second is a more ambitious level of integration.

The industry opportunity for India

India’s AVNL initiative is a particularly significant development because it seeks to put surveillance, persistent ISR and strike drones directly onto a future tank platform. The next logical step is to add an onboard interceptor-drone capability, allowing an armoured vehicle to conduct reconnaissance, strike enemy targets and defend itself against hostile drones.

There are now four distinct capabilities worth separating:

The T-72, T-90 and Arjun fleets need appropriate modernisation. Zorawar and future platforms need protection designed into their architecture. Counter-UAS, electronic warfare, active protection, battlefield networking and indigenous technology must become complementary elements of the same transformation.