The story of the first India–Pakistan war cannot begin with Indian troops landing in Srinagar on 27 October 1947. It must begin five days earlier, when armed tribal forces crossed from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir, advancing towards the capital and precipitating Maharaja Hari Singh’s appeal for military assistance and accession to India. As 22 October marks the invasion’s seventy-ninth anniversary, that chronology exposes a fundamental omission in Pakistan’s portrayal of India as the original aggressor: it foregrounds the Indian response while obscuring the assault that prompted it. Examining the events in their proper sequence—and reading the subsequent United Nations resolutions in full—reveals the distance between Islamabad’s claims and the historical record. It also warrants a scrutiny of the ground realities of the political, social, and economical outlook in the territories occupied by Pakistan.
INVASION BEFORE INTERVENTION: SETTING THE KASHMIR RECORD STRAIGHT
The starting point is the position of Jammu and Kashmir after Partition. Maharaja Hari Singh had not immediately joined either India or Pakistan. By October 1947, there were episodes of internal rifts, particularly in Poonch, as well as certain incidents of communal violence. These circumstances complicate any simplistic account of an otherwise peaceful state suddenly overtaken by conflict. They do not, however, erase the distinction between an internal wrangle and an armed invasion from across its borders. On 22 October 1947, tribal forces from Pakistan attacked the Muzaffarabad sector. They overwhelmed positions held by the Maharaja’s forces and advanced along the route to Baramulla and Srinagar. Pakistan’s subsequent characterization of the conflict as an exclusively indigenous struggle omits this intervention. Local opposition in certain sections to Hari Singh was real; so was the arrival of armed men from outside his state. One does not cancel out the other.
Tribal lashkar from Pakistan on their way to Kashmir.
Evidence of Pakistani involvement extends beyond Indian official accounts. Pakistani Army officer Akbar Khan’s book Raiders in Kashmir, alongside other historical accounts, documents the Pakistani state’s role in the invasion. These accounts undermine Islamabad’s portrayal of the operation as an organic uprising driven solely by local resistance. Attempts to disassociate Pakistan from the invasion, despite accounts by its military officers detailing the operation, expose the contradictions in its official narrative. Such denials obscure the historical record rather than withstand scrutiny, ultimately weakening Pakistan’s credibility on the very issue it continues to invoke internationally.
The raiders’ advance threatened Srinagar and forced the Maharaja to confront the question he had long postponed: where could he obtain the military assistance needed to defend his state? His answer appears in his letter to Governor-General Lord Mountbatten, dated 26 October 1947. “A grave emergency has arisen in my state,” he wrote, requesting immediate assistance. After describing the invasion, he conveyed his decision to accede to India and enclosed the Instrument of Accession. Whatever the assessment of Hari Singh’s policies, the sequence records a ruler seeking assistance amid an advancing invasion, rather than an Indian government initiating an unsolicited conquest. The Instrument bears the date 26 October 1947, and Mountbatten accepted it on 27 October. Under its terms, Hari Singh acceded to India on specified subjects, principally defense, external affairs, and communications. This instrument formed the legal basis on which India justified its intervention to defend Jammu and Kashmir.
Indian Troops landing in Kashmir in 27 October, 1947.
On 27 October 1947, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar, with the 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment among the first to arrive. The chronology is unequivocal: the tribal invasion began on 22 October, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October, and its acceptance and India’s military deployment followed on 27 October. A narrative that begins with the arrival of Indian troops conveniently omits the invasion that precipitated their deployment. The central flaw in Pakistan’s account is not its acknowledgement of Kashmir’s internal grievances, but its failure to account for the intervention that transformed those grievances into a wider military conflict. By portraying India’s response as the starting point, Islamabad reverses cause and consequence, obscuring the sequence of events that led to accession and military intervention.
INVOKING THE UN, IGNORING THE TERMS: PAKISTAN’S PLEBISCITE ARGUMENT
The same selective interpretation appears in Pakistan’s invocation of United Nations resolutions. Islamabad repeatedly presents a plebiscite as though it were an isolated mandate that India alone was required to implement. The actual documents establish a broader process involving obligations on both countries, including substantial withdrawal responsibilities for Pakistan. Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on 21 April 1948, called on Pakistan to use its “best endeavours” to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident in Jammu and Kashmir who had entered the state to fight. It also called on Pakistan to prevent further incursions and the provision of material assistance to those fighting there. These provisions undermine any interpretation that treats the presence and support of outside fighters as irrelevant to resolving the dispute. Pakistan’s invocation of the proposed plebiscite remains defective without acknowledging the withdrawal obligations that formed part of the UN framework.
Instrument of Accession of Jammu & Kashmir.
The resolution also addressed India’s military presence. Once the UN Commission confirmed the withdrawal of tribal fighters and the effectiveness of arrangements to end the conflict, India was to progressively reduce its forces to the minimum required to support civil administration. The proposed plebiscite formed part of this broader framework, alongside safeguards for political freedom, the return of displaced persons, and protection against intimidation. The UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 made Pakistan’s military obligations more explicit, describing the presence of its regular troops as a “material change” in the situation previously represented to the Security Council. Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces and secure the withdrawal of tribal fighters and other Pakistani nationals who had entered to fight. India’s subsequent force reductions were linked to the implementation of these arrangements, establishing a phased process of demilitarization rather than an unconditional demand for an immediate plebiscite.
This language matters for two reasons. First, it acknowledges a Pakistani military presence that contradicts the portrayal of the conflict as exclusively an indigenous uprising. Second, it establishes that the proposed plebiscite was inseparable from negotiated demilitarisation. Pakistan could not disregard its withdrawal obligations while treating the plebiscite as an independent, enforceable demand. Yet the required withdrawal was never completed. The US Congressional Research Service confirms that the first step envisaged under Resolution 47 was never implemented. This failure is central to evaluating Pakistan’s claim that it merely seeks faithful implementation of the UN framework. Invoking the proposed final stage while overlooking an unfulfilled preliminary obligation presents an incomplete account of the resolutions. The contradiction is clear: Islamabad cannot credibly demand adherence to the UN process while excluding the withdrawal provisions that formed an essential part of its proposed implementation.
THE “AZAD” ILLUSION: WHERE PAKISTAN’S FREEDOM NARRATIVE MEETS REALITY
The word “Azad” means “free.” Pakistan’s official name for the territory it administers west of the Line of Control is “Azad Kashmir”; it therefore carries a political message: that its government represents the aspirations of Kashmiris and offers an alternative to Indian administration. Pakistan’s argument rests on a contemporary contrast: Indian administration is described as domination, while the territories under Pakistani control are presented as expressions of Kashmiri freedom. But a name is not proof of freedom. The more meaningful test lies in whether people can choose their representatives, question those in power, demand a fair share of local resources, and protest without fear of state violence.
Recent unrest in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir has brought these questions into sharp focus. What began as a movement over electricity prices, flour subsidies and economic grievances developed into a wider confrontation over political representation and Islamabad’s influence. The protests have exposed a widening gap between Pakistan’s language of Kashmiri self-determination and the lived concerns of people within the territory it calls Azad. The central contradiction is not that Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has no institutions or elections. It has a legislative assembly. The question is how free and fair these institutions are and can exercise their power independently. Critics have long questioned the credibility of these institutions and the influence of Pakistan’s federal government over local affairs.
Unarmed Protestors killed by indiscriminate firing by Pakistani troops in Mirpur, POJK.
One of the most contentious issues in the recent protests has been the allocation of 12 seats in the territory’s Legislative Assembly to Kashmiri refugees living elsewhere in Pakistan. The Jammu-Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a grassroots movement campaigning for economic and political rights, argues that it gives political parties based in Pakistan disproportionate influence over the government of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Because voters in these constituencies live outside the territory, they do not experience its everyday economic conditions and public-service challenges in the same way as residents who live there. Ultimately, Pakistan’s establishment uses these 12 seats in the 53-member Assembly to manage political outcomes and install a government of its choosing. Local groups have long opposed political management through these 12 seats. The dispute intensified in 2026, when the JAAC demanded the abolition of these 12 seats.
Pakistani Military kills innocent civilians in open firing in Mirpur of Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir.
In response, the authorities designated the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) as a proscribed organisation under the anti-terrorism legislation. International organisations criticised the decision, warning that branding a civic movement as a terrorist organisation raised serious concerns about freedom of association and peaceful protest. The authorities’ response turned the dispute into a major confrontation leading to mass arrests, restrictions on communications and the use of lethal force during the crackdown. The violence escalated on 15 July 2026, when at least 28 peaceful protesters died in an opening firing by Pakistan security forces. Several local accounts state that the numbers of deaths were way more than reported. To curb the information regarding killings, the authorities imposed a blanket ban on press and communications in the region.
Perhaps the most revealing feature of the recent unrest has been the treatment of the movement itself. Rather than remaining a dispute over subsidies and economic policy, the confrontation expanded into a struggle over the right to organise, criticise the government and demand institutional change. The proscription of the JAAC, the brutal crackdown and restrictions on communications raised serious concerns about civic freedoms. The protests over electricity, flour and public services have revealed persistent economic grievances. The word Azad carries a promise. It suggests that the people of a territory enjoy the freedom to govern themselves, protect their identity and determine their political future. These events challenge the proposition that the word “Azad” describes and have showcased the ugly ground reality.
CONCLUSION
The significance of 22 October 1947 lies in the history Pakistan’s occupation narrative leaves unfinished: an invasion from its territory precipitated the Maharaja’s appeal, accession, and India’s military response. The subsequent UN framework cannot be separated from Pakistan’s unfulfilled withdrawal obligations, just as its present-day advocacy of self-determination cannot be separated from restrictions on political choice under its own administration. These are not disconnected inconsistencies; together, they expose a persistent gap between Islamabad’s claims and its conduct. Recognizing that gap establishes a consistent standard: neither historical responsibility nor the rights of local people can be selectively invoked. Until Pakistan confronts its role in the conflict and permits meaningful dissent in the territories it occupies, its claim to speak for Kashmiri freedom will remain unconvincing.
