The New Normal in South Asia: Evaluating India’s Post-Uri Strategy

The question we will be answering today is, How India’s Defence & Foreign Policy Changed After Uri, Pulwama, and Op Sindoor
So for a long time, India’s policy on dealing with cross-border terrorism from Pakistan was seen as, well, kind of soft. It was mostly reactive. You get hit, you complain, you show evidence, you try diplomacy. The whole thing was done under the pretext of strategic restraint against nuclear Pakistan. But after the big attacks in Uri and then Pulwama, that whole playbook of dealing with cross-border terrorism changed.

So, yeah, the short answer is that India’s policy has totally changed. It evolved from being passive and defensive to a new approach, which can be described as a calibrated, proactive, punitive deterrent posture, essentially a deterrent through punishment. That’s a fancy way of saying India will now hit back, but in a limited way to punish and send a message, without starting a full-blown war. It’s about making the cost of sponsoring terrorism too high for Pakistan.
Here’s how it changed.
The First Big Shift: 2016 Surgical Strikes After Uri

In September 2016, terrorists attacked an army camp in Uri, killing 18 soldiers. Just ten days later, the Indian Army does what it is known for. They announced they conducted surgical strikes. Surgical strikes were not the surprising part, but DGMO said the special forces crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and took out terrorist launch pads. Such surgical strikes happened before across the LoC(For example, Operation Ginger), but this time, the government wanted everyone to know. It was a message to Pakistan, we can come across whenever we want. And to the world, it was a signal to show we are responsible, we are only hitting terrorists.
This was the first big change from our old policy of restraint.
2019 Pulwama & Balakot Airstrike
February 14/2019, a convoy of CRPF was hit by a suicide bomber in Pulwama and killed 40 soldiers. It was the worst attack in decades. There was anticipation that something in line with surgical strikes had to happen.
But this India upped the ladder. This time, it was the Indian Air Force. IAF Mirages armed with Spice2000 LGBs flew into Pakistan, not just Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but deep inside, crossing the international border. They struck the terrorist training camp in Balakot. For the first time since 1971, Indian planes crossed into Pakistan. It showed India was willing to use air power, not just ground troops. The message was that we can reach anywhere. Your nuclear weapons won’t stop us from striking.
The Diplomatic Offensive: Isolating Pakistan Globally

But see, it wasn’t just about military stuff. At the same time, India went all out on a diplomatic front against Pakistan. This was a key part of the new policy. The government started diplomatic efforts to expose Pakistan everywhere. In the UN and other places, with dossiers and proofs to show the world that Pakistan was supporting groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba.
India pushed for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to put Pakistan on its grey list for not stopping terror financing. Additionally, India cut off all talks completely with Pakistan until it stops terrorism.
The New Normal: Operation Sindoor
On April 22, a brutal attack on innocent tourists in Pahalgam sent the entire nation into shock, and public anger was such that a major retaliation against this barbaric terrorist action was imminent. On May 7, Indian armed forces did what they do, Indian Air Forces struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and the PoK were struck in Operation Sindoor. Among the major ones were:
- Markaz-e-Taiba, Muridke (LeT headquarters / training site)
- Subhan Allah Mosque (Bahawalpur / Ahmedpur East) — JeM facility.
- Masjid-e-Abbas / Masjid Abbas (Kotli District) — JeM facility.
The strikes conducted under Operation Sindoor were much deeper into Pakistan and comprehensive than the Pulwama strike. PM Modi called this new precedent “New Normal”, signalling that India has established a new standard operating framework for its policy towards terrorism emanating from Pakistan. While normal bilateral, diplomatic, trade engagements remained suspended, the major outcome of this event was India’s refusal to accept the distinction between terrorist organisations and the Pakistani government/Army that sponsors their existence and infrastructure. Our foreign secretary, in a press conference, highlighted the presence of senior Pakistan army and government officials at the funeral of terrorists who were killed in Indian strikes to prove the point.
India clarified the strikes were precise, measured and proportionate, targeted at terrorist infrastructure and designed to avoid unnecessary escalation and civilian casualties and focused on destroying the infrastructure that planned and directed cross-border terrorist attacks. We preferred not to escalate but clarified that we would respond decisively to any further provocations.
However, Pakistan chose to escalate in response to India’s May 7 strikes. Pakistani forces shelled towns along the LoC and IB (notably Poonch, Rajouri, Kupwara, Baramulla, Uri, and Samba) with mortars and artillery. Usage of armed drones and loitering munitions against civilian areas, along with military locations, however, the incoming threats were neutralised by our air defence systems.
As conflict intensified, India carried out further strikes on 8–10 May targeting Pakistani military aviation and air-defence infrastructure. These included Rafiqui (PAF Base Mushaf), Murid (Murid/Markaz area), Chaklala (Rawalpindi), Rafiqui / Mushaf, Bholari, Sargodha, Skardu, Jacobabad, Sialkot aviation base, Rahim Yar Khan (Sheikh Zayed/Rahim Yar Khan airport). India said these were limited, targeted actions to degrade Pakistani air capability and to neutralise radars/air-defence nodes that had been used (or could be used) against Indian forces.
All of this marked a shift, with the government publicly stating it will not accept nuclear intimidation as a constraint on our counter-terror options, and any reckless escalation by the Pakistani state. Along with military response, India also stepped up its diplomacy to justify its actions as well as expose Pakistan once again(It’s not new for Pakistani’s to face humiliation).
India repeated its evidence diplomacy, which was used during Balakot and Uri, again in 2025. India’s diplomatic measures included large parliamentary delegations led by our parliamentarians across all party lines, briefings for foreign envoys and communication of our intent to world leaders by our Prime Minister and foreign minister. World leaders, though, urged restraint but supported India’s right to self-defence.
But still there are gaps to fill
While India has adopted a punitive deterrence model against cross-border terrorism, its effectiveness depends on having a cutting-edge military capability over Pakistan. Militarily, India must strengthen its air power, surveillance, precision-strike, and joint theatre capabilities to ensure joint and calibrated responses. Acquisitions under MMRCA 2.0, Refueller, AWACS, and ISR platforms are still pending. Not just this, but there are other areas where we need to upgrade our capability, but that’s for another day to discuss.
Also, India must keep Pakistan under constant diplomatic pressure, working with our partners, the US, the EU, and the Gulf, to expose its state sponsorship of terror. Terrorism from Pakistan is a global security challenge and not just a bilateral issue for India.
And lastly, cross-border strikes against terrorists are great, but these kinds of strikes happen only when there is a major terror incident; however, frequent minor terror incidents in Kashmir often gets overlooked, where we still lose our soldiers, thus there must be a clear and comprehensive strategy for responding to such minor as well as major terror incidents.
Note: There are no major or minor terror incidents; terror attacks are terror attacks which involve loss of innocent lives. I used the terms ‘minor and major’ just to highlight the scale and intensity.


