The New Nuclear Debate: How Nuclear Weapons Are Becoming Warfighting Tools

In the first part of the article, we’ll discuss countries that attempted to build nuclear weapons and couldn’t do so, and in the second part of the article we’ll discuss an interesting yet developing scenario where nuclear weapons are becoming weapons of war, a remarkable shift from their status as weapons of deterrence.

Countries That Tried to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Why They Ultimately Gave Up

Countries That Tried but Failed to Join the Nuclear Club

Germany (World War II)

Nazi Germany’s Uranium Project is one of the earliest attempts to weaponise nuclear energy. Despite having talented physicists like Werner Heisenberg, the program was hindered by limited resources as the Nazi’s overstretched their resources, along with the expulsion of Jewish scientists who might have helped in the project. Allied forces sabotaged heavy-water facilities in Norway, further impeding German efforts. After 1945, the Allies not only occupied Germany but also explicitly prohibited nuclear weapons research. Today, Germany remains a threshold state, possessing advanced nuclear technology but constrained by international treaties and domestic politics.

Spain

Under Francisco Franco, Spain launched Project Islero in 1963 with assistance from France. Yet gave up by the 1970s, under US pressure, which threatened to halt uranium fuel supplies. After Franco’s death, Spain joined NATO in 1982 and eventually signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1987, formally abandoning its program.

Switzerland

Switzerland has historically been neutral, but during the Cold War it feared an external invasion primarily from the Soviet Union. This policy was based on its security doctrine of “armed neutrality”, which was to deter any potential invasion by making the cost of conquering Switzerland high. However program never materialised owing to technical challenges and cost. It signed the NPT in 1969 and ratified it in 1977, formally ending its nuclear ambitions.

Sweden

Perhaps the most advanced European non-nuclear state, Sweden developed an extensive program after 1948. As a neutral country, Sweden believed it needed a deterrent to defend against a Soviet invasion, especially against soviet tactical nukes. But as the cost increased, along with strong public opposition, it abandoned the idea in the 1960s and signed the NPT in 1968.

Romania and Yugoslavia

Both Balkan states pursued secret programs under communist regimes. Romania’s Danube Program successfully produced fissile material but lacked the expertise to assemble a bomb. It collapsed after Ceaușescu’s fall in 1989. Yugoslavia began as early as 1945, but financial burdens and U.S. pressure ended its efforts by 1987.

Iraq

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq attempted to dominate the Middle East. The Osirak reactor, the centrepiece of the program, was destroyed by Israel in Operation Opera (1981). Subsequent U.S. military action during the 1991 Gulf War dismantled the remaining facilities.

Libya and Syria

Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya pursued a program through black-market networks but abandoned it in 2003 under U.S. pressure, hoping for sanctions relief and international reintegration. Syria, meanwhile, covertly constructed a reactor with North Korean aid, but Israel destroyed it in Operation Outside the Box (2007).

Brazil and Argentina

Both nations, driven by regional rivalry, started parallel secret programs during the Cold War. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, with democracy returning, the two signed bilateral agreements and joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco, agreeing to keep Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Countries That Built and Then Dismantled Weapons

South Africa

The only state to develop nuclear weapons and then voluntarily dismantle them, South Africa developed six warheads during the apartheid era. Fearing Soviet intervention in southern Africa and seeking regional dominance, South Africa viewed nuclear weapons as essential. Yet with the end of apartheid, the government dismantled its nukes in the early 1990s.

Post-Soviet States: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus

The collapse of the Soviet Union left thousands of warheads scattered outside Russia. Ukraine briefly held the world’s third-largest arsenal, while Kazakhstan and Belarus also inherited strategic systems. Under the Budapest Memorandum (1994), these states agreed to transfer weapons back to Russia in exchange for security assurances, economic aid, and NPT membership as non-nuclear states.

The Shifting Role of Nuclear Weapons in Modern Conflict

Now in this section, we’ll see if nuclear weapons, once developed for strategic purposes such as for deterrent, are now becoming a weapon that can be used in the conflict for tactical advantages, or in simple words, we’ll see if countries are thinking of using nukes in a battlefield similar to other systems like conventional bombs.

Now, when we look at the current trend, the line between conventional and nuclear weapons is no longer as clear as it used to be. Nuclear weapons, once seen as a last-resort option meant only for deterrence, are now being integrated into battlefield planning. This is by developing low-yield warheads, dual-capable missiles that can carry either nuclear or conventional payloads, that put nukes right into regional war scenarios. For example, Russia openly mixes its nuclear and conventional strategies, Pakistan has developed short-range systems like Nasr specifically for tactical use, and the U.S. has even deployed the low-yield W76-2(which is about 5 kilotons) on its submarines to counter “limited” nuclear use by others.

Add to this NATO’s modernisation of the B61-12 bomb and China’s DF-26 missile, which can shift from conventional to nuclear in the same system, and what we get is a situation where countries will no longer be certain what kind of strike is incoming in a crisis. That uncertainty itself lowers the threshold for nuclear use.

The danger here is simple, when nukes are being treated like “just another tool” in conventional war, the risks of escalation shoot up. Theatre-level deployments, dual-use systems, and doctrines that broaden the conditions for first use, like North Korea’s automatic retaliation law or Russia’s tying of use to threats to sovereignty. The results in to an unstable environment, where a conventional clash could spiral into nuclear escalation, not because leaders wanted to go nuclear, but because the threshold for nuclear use has been lowered.

But what does this concerning development mean to India’s security and its nuclear doctrine.

For India, this blurring of nuclear and conventional lines poses significant consequences. Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons or as Pakistanis call them as “pav kilo bumb”, like the Nasr, are explicitly designed to counter India’s conventional superiority and doctrines such as Cold Start, making it difficult for India to maintain its doctrine of “credible minimum deterrence” and a declared No First Use policy, thus our planning should be for such scenarios where nuclear thresholds are much lower across our western border.