International

Ayni Exit – India Loses Its Tajik Third Eye

India wraps up its operations at the Ayni Airbase, which was a gem of a watch tower for India to see whatever unraveled in PoK, Pakistan, Afghanistan and overall Central Asia in terms of Chinese and Russian control. 

The Eurasian connections are quite necessary for India since the conflicts take a heated position in today’s world. When India is swarmed by enemies, and the global powers are determined to create dominance over India inside out, the Central Asian country of Tajikistan is a name of great importance to New Delhi. 

About Ayni and Farkhor Airbase

Google Earth image of Ayni Air Base (Source)

The now left airbase, is located just 10km west to Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Dushanbe has no ordinary foothold on Central Asian affairs. Mumbai and Dushanbe are almost equal far from New Delhi – and this gives a clear idea how geographically crucial the place is.

In 1996, India’s RAW negotiated use of Tajikistan’s Farkhor Air Base to support the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban, including medical care for injured fighters. By 2002, India confirmed plans to restore the base, with Russian help. A $10M tender failed, so the Border Roads Organisation completed the work by 2006, with reports of deploying MiG-29 jets. More on the Farkhor airbase in this DefenceXP article.

This was vacated by the Indian air force by 2008. The operations were fully centralised to Ayni, where the bilateral agreement lapsed in 2022. Now, India’s third eye on Central Asia is lost.

The Probable Sino-Russian Pressure on Tajikistan

Speculations claim that the operation of this airbase has been paused due to bilateral disagreements between India and Tajikistan, which had already ended in 2021-22. It can be assumed that the pressure has been put on the Tajikistan government by both Russia and China. What is left for discussion, is the reasons why this has happened in the hindsight and what its aftermath can be.

The speculated pressure to eradicate the Ayni hold is for several reasons. Ayni and Farkhor both have been geographically perfect watch towers for India. The main foreign airbases of Tajikistan are the Russia 201st airbase (Dushanbe) and Chinese airbase in the mountainous southern region of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province of Tajikistan close to the Wakhan corridor. Wakhan is a narrow strip of land in Afghanistan, about 350 kilometres (220 miles) between Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan to the south. It connects Afghanistan to China’s Xinjiang region in the east and is historically significant as part of the ancient Silk Road.

Wakhan and Its Significance

The Wakhan Corridor (Source)

In terms of the Indo-Pak-Afghan relations, Wakhan has always stood as a stronger connection than the British-defined Durand line. It has Gilgit-Baltistan at its border which is now a part of PoJK – which is more inclined to be a part of India, but Pakistan has carefully rigged the demographics to make that association unlikely. The Taliban government of Afghanistan clearly knows that Wakhan is a tough terrain along the modern Silk Road and hence has great control over the region.

Chinese Funds and Favours to Tajikistan

Xi Jinping (President of People’s Republic of China) and Emomali Rahmon (President of Tajikistan) (Source)

The Chinese airbase close to Wakhan, along with alleged facilities and signal monitoring towers is perfectly located – to ward off extremist beliefs and unrest away from Xinjiang province where the Uyghur muslims may create internal unrest.

Chinese investment in Tajikistan has grown significantly over the years, with cumulative investments reaching $4.0 billion from 2007 to 2023, of which $2.5 billion were direct investments. In 2021 alone, China invested $463 million in Tajikistan’s economy, with $430 million being direct investments. Major exports included rubber footwear (USD 109 million), coated flat-rolled iron (USD 90.4 million), and motor vehicle parts (USD 85.5 million).

China is now Tajikistan’s largest foreign investor and a major trading partner, with 21.2% of Tajikistan’s foreign trade turnover involving China. Since 2003, bilateral trade between China and Tajikistan has grown over 6000%, reaching $2 billion annually.

Chinese companies are heavily involved in various sectors, including cement production, where they account for 85% of the country’s output, and agriculture, where they have invested in restoring abandoned land affected by erosion.

The Belt and Road Initiatives extended to Tajikistan for the foothold on Central Asia has indeed been successful through different probes and security cooperations. It has materialised infrastructure, trade routes, and energy projects, such as the Dushanbe-Chanak highway and hydropower dams. These projects improved internal and regional connectivity, boosted energy production, and created industrial zones intended to diversify the economy and generate employment.

Needless to say, China has strong clenches on how the country’s infrastructure behaves, even though no direct correlation can be made with its GDP growth to Chinese investments like how the linearity is observable in case of countries such as Kyrgyzstan

Russian Influence over Tajikistan

Emomali Rahmon (President of Tajikistan) and Vladimir Putin (President of Russia) (Source)

Russian influence has been deep-rooted due to the Soviet legacy Tajikistan inherits. Tajikistan is a key support system for Russia to assert dominion in Central Asia and also to ward off Islamic movements from the likes of Afghanistan. At some points in the last decade, remittances sent home by Tajik migrants in Russia accounted for up to 52% of Tajikistan’s GDP, as per World Bank in 2014. 

Russia maintains a significant military presence in Tajikistan with the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, originally stationed since the 1940s (Soviet era) and vital in supporting the pro-government side in the Tajik Civil War (1992–97). After the civil war, out of 5.5 million people, an estimated 320,000 (mainly ethnic minorities) left, many relocating to Russia, deepening social and political dependence.

Russian military influence is strong as Tajikistan is a part of both CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperative Organisation). The country follows a lot of Russian military influence, and the influence of FSB can surely not be undermined in the discussion.

Hence, it leaves no room for directionless speculation that the 201st Division airbase is a very crucial control point of Russian military influence. India had its personnel stationed for two decades in zones close to the Russian base as well in terms of distance, and hence, might be a matter of concern for Russia in terms of dominance, secrecy – or both, which is vaguely unclear. 

Aftermath

According to analysts, the loss of Ayni airbase hits a strategic blow to the Central Asian connection and dependence on Pakistan for land connectivity. While some may observe this as a sudden blow to Indian diplomacy, this may really be a wrong assumption. India had already started calling off any reported personnel and fleet in the airbase.

The backfoot, though evident, might not be sudden. All this might have been of great clarity even before the likes of Operation Sindoor had unfolded – as this is not a meagre aspect to skip in terms of geopolitics. If India has lost its Central Asian eye, it will prepare for some other sensory organs out there.

Koustav Bhattacharjee

Myself Koustav Bhattacharjee, a final year mechanical engineering student at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. I am enthusiastic about defence related technology and accompanied studies of FEA and CFD - contributing to DefenceXP network for thrive along my journey of learning.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back to top button
Translate »