The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War (Bangladesh Liberation War) is still a sore point in Pakistan’s official narrative. Pakistan’s textbooks and politicians often spin the past denying genocidal crimes, blaming India for every twist, and bragging of moral victories. Indian readers should be clear eyed. These are myths, not history. Below we debunk ten of Pakistan’s most persistent propaganda points, with evidence from declassified records, contemporaneous accounts and even Pakistani inquiries. (Spoiler: Pakistan’s own Hamoodur Rahman report admits soldiers committed “wanton arson, killings and rape”– not exactly a counter-insurgency success story.)
Lie #1: “There was no genocide in East Pakistan – the military only crushed a minor rebellion.”
Truth: The facts say otherwise. Multiple investigations – from international observers to Pakistan’s own documents show a deliberate campaign of mass murder. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission (set up by Pakistan in 1972) explicitly found the army had carried out “senseless and wanton arson, killings and rape” under the pretext of quelling a rebellion. Independent analysts likewise estimate 1–2 million Bengalis were killed. Even US and UN sources at the time used the word genocide. In short, Pakistan’s armed forces did not merely fight terrorists they slaughtered civilians on a massive scale.
Lie #2: “Pakistani troops didn’t rape or brutalize Bengali women – those reports are Indian propaganda.”
Truth: This is flatly false. Pakistan’s own records and many survivor testimonies confirm widespread war crimes against civilians. The Hamoodur report and eyewitness accounts document the rape of Bengali women as part of a systematic campaign. Estimates range into the hundreds of thousands: for example, one scholarly review cites 200,000–400,000 Bengali women raped during the 1971 war. Such figures come from warcrimes tribunals in Bangladesh and human rights researchers. Moreover, Pakistani generals eventually admitted excesses. In 2002, Gen. Pervez Musharraf visited the Dhaka war memorial and wrote in the visitor’s book: “the excesses committed during the unfortunate period are regretted”. If it were all a lie, why would Pakistan’s own leader apologize to Bangladesh for “excesses” of 1971?
Lie #3: “The Awami League/Bengalis were the real villains: they conspired with India to break Pakistan.”
Truth: No evidence supports that claim. In 1970, East Pakistan’s Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won an overwhelming democratic mandate (160 of 162 seats in East Pakistan) to form the central government. West Pakistani leaders refused to honor the election. Instead of transferring power to the clear winners, President Yahya Khan delayed the National Assembly and even appointed a hand-picked Bengali premier to block Mujib. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s ruling generals launched Operation Searchlight on 25–26 March 1971: a surprise night-time assault that “indiscriminately massacred unarmed, sleeping Bengalis” in Dhaka. It was this violent crackdown not any prearranged “coup” by Mujib that touched off the independence war. In fact, Pakistan’s own 1971 White Paper (a propaganda booklet) later alleged a grand Bengali-Indian conspiracy, but a post-war Pakistani inquiry found no evidence of Awami League massacres of non-Bengalis. In short, the Awami League won fair elections, Pakistan reneged on democracy, and Pakistan created the very crisis it blamed on “Indian-backed separatists.”
Lie #4: “Bengalis massacred Urdu-speaking Biharis/‘West Pakistanis’ by the tens of thousands!”
Truth: This is a totally exaggeration. It is true that some Urdu speaking civilians (often called “Biharis” in Bangladesh) supported Pakistan and suffered reprisals. But credible studies put those casualties in the hundreds, not tens of thousands. A fair estimate is roughly 100–1,500 Biharis killed during the chaos of 1971. (Even Bihari advocacy groups have not claimed more than a few thousand.) By contrast, Pakistan’s 1971 propaganda white paper absurdly claimed 64,000 Biharis were killed. That figure has zero independent support. Contemporary accounts and later research agree that no “massacre of tens of thousands” occurred the tragedy was real but on a much smaller scale. So don’t buy the Pakistani myth that 1971 was “even-handed” carnage in fact, the overwhelming majority of victims were ethnic Bengalis, not Urdu-speakers.
Lie #5: “India invaded illegally and forced Bangladesh into existence; without Indian aggression, East Pakistan would still be intact.”
Truth: India’s intervention came after a massive humanitarian and refugee crisis. By late 1971, up to 10 million Bengalis had fled into India to escape the Pakistani army’s crackdown. International appeals for help had failed. India repeatedly warned Pakistan to stop killing civilians and to allow elections, to no avail. It was only after millions of refugees strained India’s resources that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to act “rather than to take in millions of refugees”. India’s actual military campaign (starting 3 Dec 1971) lasted just 13 days and focused on liberating East Pakistan, after which Indian forces withdrew. The new nation of Bangladesh was then recognized by most countries, not “occupied.” In short, India was responding to brutality, not plotting it. Even U.S. diplomatic cables of the time noted the scale of Pakistan’s atrocities and the inevitability of intervention. The narrative that “India conjured up Bangladesh out of thin air” has no basis in fact it ignores the 1970 election results and Operation Searchlight.
Lie #6: “Pakistan generously offered autonomy to East Pakistan, but Bengali leaders insisted on separation.”
Truth: Autonomy promises in 1970 were outweighed by Pakistan’s intransigence. Sheikh Mujib had presented a Six-Point program to grant East Pakistan wide self-rule while keeping Pakistan united. When Awami League swept the elections, West Pakistani leaders panicked. Instead of crafting a federal constitution, they vetoed the plan. In the last days before war, Bhutto’s advisers even floated a confederation model but rejected Mujib’s simple demand for major share of power. The reality is that Yahya and Bhutto refused to let democracy work. They outlawed the Awami League and launched a military assault (Searchlight) on 25–26 March 1971. This brutal response not any unreasonable demand by Bengalis made secession unavoidable. Remember: Pakistan’s top court-appointed commission found that Pakistan’s leaders aimed to “preserve unity” by crushing dissent, not by compromise.
Lie #7: “Pakistan Army won every engagement except in the East; our fighters were brave, and our generals surrendered only because of betrayal.”
Truth: Pakistan’s military performance in 1971 was a rout. On 3 December, Pakistan launched attacks on India’s western sector; India retaliated immediately. Within two weeks, Pakistan’s Eastern Command in Dhaka capitulated completely. About 93,000 Pakistani troops including generals, airmen and soldiers were taken prisoner by India on 16 Dec 1971. (This was an unprecedented surrender, even larger than Pakistan’s losses in 1965.) Thousands more surrendered as civilians or local auxiliaries. In practical terms, nearly the entire eastern military machine melted away. Claims of “betrayal” by any one officer cannot hide that Pakistan’s army was comprehensively overwhelmed by Indian forces in the east. The fact that India could take such a large number of prisoners and do so rapidly undermines any notion of “narrow loss.” If anything, the evidence shows Pakistan’s defeat was decisive, not a lucky break for India.
Lie #8: “The 1971 defeat was only a temporary setback, and Pakistan actually gained from the war in international prestige.”
Truth: Let’s be blunt, losing 54% of your country is not a victory, temporary or otherwise. Pakistan’s “East wing” contained the majority of its population and most of its people of Bengali descent. After 1971, Pakistan was a fraction of its former size and influence. Western media and world leaders saw it as a humiliating defeat. Even Pakistan’s own generals admitted it was “a political failure” of the regime. The Hamoodur report in 1974 emphasized the army’s “debacle”. It found that the military machine had suffered massive losses and had failed morally in its conduct. There was no grand strategic gain for Pakistan only loss of territory, military hardware and tens of thousands of casualties. (For perspective, Pakistan lost one third of its armed forces: 50,000 dead or wounded plus the 93,000 captured.) Post-1971 Pakistan never regained any international standing it merely struggled to stabilize what remained. To claim the war “worked out well” for Pakistan is wishful thinking at best.
Lie #9: “Attacks on Pakistani Hindus or other minority Muslims were worst during that period.”
Truth: Some Pakistani narratives depict 1971 as a Hindu backed uprising, but it was fundamentally a popular Muslim majority movement (the Awami League itself was Bengali Muslim led). It is true Pakistani families and Biharis suffered violence but by Pakistani forces’ own admission, non-Bengalis were collateral, not the main target. What Pakistanis remember as their own victimhood pales compared to what the Bangladeshi majority endured. Indeed, the Hamoodur report does not even mention genocide because it was focused on Pakistani losses. The scale of attacks on Hindus and Bengali intellectuals in 1971 was very large, and almost entirely one-way. (For example, one eyewitness described sweeping “kill all Hindu men” orders from junior officers.) When Pakistan’s Foreign Office publicly decried executions in Bangladesh decades later, Dhaka rightly pointed out that Islamabad was ignoring Pakistan’s own 1971 record. Pakistan has never issued a proper apology for 1971. In fact, Pakistani leaders still tend to blame Bangladeshis for “unfortunate events.” But most historians agree that the Pakistani Army was the main perpetrator of atrocities, not the other way around.
Lie #10: “Pakistan’s history books and leaders admit nothing – but even Pakistan’s generals privately say the real story.”
Truth: It is true that Pakistan’s official history glosses over 1971. But if we look at declassified evidence and on the record statements, a very different picture emerges. For instance, the U.S. National Security Archive and British records (recently released) include intercepted communications of Yahya Khan and others admitting to massive killing of unarmed civilians. And as noted, even Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa later called it a “political failure” of those in charge. Meanwhile, Pakistani media (like Dawn and investigative authors) have begun admitting uncomfortable facts about 1971. On the ground in 1971, UN observers and American diplomats (not to mention The New York Times and BBC) reported villages razed and refugee columns piling up. In short, the archival record and eyewitness accounts support the Bangladeshi narrative far more than Pakistan’s those inconvenient truths will be remembered, regardless of what textbooks say.
Also Read, Decoded: 50-Year-Old Pakistani Fiction Vs Fact
Conclusion:
The story of 1971 remains painful, but India should remember it correctly. The ten myths above are convenient for Pakistan’s propaganda, but each collapses under scrutiny of real documents and testimony. A modern democracy values facts over myths and history demands it. Pakistan can keep clinging to fiction (“it was all Kashmir’s fault!”, “victory on western front!”, etc.), but the Indian public and international scholars know the truth: East Pakistan’s people won their freedom against a brutal military regime, and suffered a horrific genocide in the process. As India commemorates its own role in liberating Bangladesh, the lessons of 1971 and the evidence must not be forgotten.
