For some time now, we have been hearing about “Make in India” and “Atmanirbharta” in the defence sector. However, the truth is that India had the chance to be much more self-reliant a long time ago. We just kept messing it up. A project starts with big dreams, then it gets delayed, faces some political problems, the military isn’t happy, and then it just dies. Or we end up buying the same thing from abroad for many times the price.
This isn’t about one or two failures. This is about a whole system that somehow keeps failing to build things at home, even when we have the blueprints and the chance. From fighter jets to submarines to rifles, the story is sadly the same.
Here’s a look at the big projects that got away, and how India could not capitalise on opportunities.
The Marut Fighter & The Engine We Didn’t Buy
So back in the 1960s, India built its own fighter jet, the HAL HF-24 Marut. This was a big deal because India was the first Asian country to build a supersonic aircraft. It was designed by a famous German engineer, Kurt Tank. The plane was good, but it had one huge problem. Its engine was weak. The original plan was to use a powerful afterburning version of the Bristol Siddeley Orpheus engine. This would have made the Marut a proper supersonic fighter, maybe even hitting Mach 2. But then the Indian government made a decision that left Marut underpowered. The Marut was designed around a significantly more powerful, afterburning version of the Orpheus (the BOr 12) that was never fully developed. Rolls-Royce said they would jointly develop the afterburning version for £13 million, and India said no.
So the Marut had to fly with a basic, non-afterburning engine. It was underpowered, couldn’t go supersonic properly, and the Indian Air Force (IAF) bought 147 of them and used them mostly for ground attack.
Although one could argue how much tech transfer or work collaboration we were getting with this partnership could be up for debate. So even today, building a fighter jet engine is our biggest weakness. The Kaveri engine project for the Tejas fighter could not achieve its intended objectives, and we are still totally dependent on foreign companies for engines.
The HF-73 Strike Jet
After the Marut, HAL proposed to design and develop a proper deep penetration strike aircraft called the HF-73. This was in the 1970s. It was supposed to be a twin-engine, built with help from a German company, Messerschmitt. It would have been fast (Mach 2) and could carry a serious weapons load similar to the Panavia Tornado aircraft that are in service with Germany and the UK(Retired).
But again, the engine problem came back. They wanted to use the powerful Rolls-Royce RB-199 engine (the same one used in the Tornado fighter), but they couldn’t get it owing to India’s closeness with the USSR and were blocked the exporting.
So the project just died, and we went out, and instead, IAF bought the British-French Jaguar and the Russian MiG-27. Both were good planes, but they were foreign. We bought them off the shelf. The HF-73 could have given us a modern, Indian-made strike fighter in the 1980s. Instead, we developed a model of import dependency. However, as much as we might criticise, it is also important to acknowledge the structural constraints faced in such projects.
How South Korea Succeeded Where We Failed
This one is maybe the most frustrating story. In 1981, India signed a great deal with the German company HDW for four Shishumar-class (Type 209) submarines. Two subs would be built in Germany, and the remaining two would be made in India at Mazagon Dock with Transfer of Technology (ToT). The idea was to learn how to build our own subs after this.
The ToT involved knowledge of system integration, trained workforce, subsystems knowledge, basic design modification, etc. The point is that whatever we got, we failed to utilise it to the fullest potential. The submarine production line of Shishumar at MDL was shut down after rolling out the final INS Shankul(S47) submarine, thus ending the loss of all the know-how and know-why.
Taking a look at South Korea, they bought the same German Type 209 submarines around the same time. They took that German technology and started building their own better versions. They moved from the Type 209 to building their own advanced KSS-III submarines, which are now 3,000-ton boats. They’re even competing to sell submarines to India now for our Project 75I.
Presently, our submarine fleet is now old except for our new Kalvari class submarines, and we are still looking at foreign companies to come and build subs for us. Hopefully, we don’t repeat the same mistake with the Kalvari class, with whatever ToT we got from the French, we should utilise it to the fullest potential.
The Mirage 2000 & The MMRCA Mess
The IAF loves its French Mirage 2000 jets. They were heroes in the Kargil War, Balakot. And we had chances to build them in India when an agreement in 1981 included an option for Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to license-produce up to 110 additional aircraft, along with 40 flyaway jets. India dropped the idea. Then, around the year 2000, after Kargil, IAF again tried to get more Mirages, but by then, Dassault had moved on to the Rafale, and the production line closed in 2004.
In the meantime, IAF launched the MMRCA tender in the 2000s to buy 126 new fighters. After years of tests and drama, the Rafale won. But then that deal also collapsed and met its dead end. In the end, after a decade of wasted time, the government just bought 36 Rafales off-the-shelf in 2016 in an emergency deal. Now we have a new MMRCA 2.0 tender, and the IAF’s squadron strength keeps falling. Our MiG-21s are gone, and the Mirages, Jaguars, and MiG-29s are getting old. Our own Tejas Mk2 is still some 5-6 years away.
If we had just built the Mirage 2000 in India back in the 80s or early 2000s, we wouldn’t be in this constant crisis looking for 2nd hand Mirages from the French, UAE for spare parts.
Transport Planes, and Rifles
The bad news doesn’t stop with fighters and subs.
- The Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA): In the early 2000s, India and Russia agreed to jointly build a new transport plane. It fell apart in 2017 because both parties couldn’t agree over costs, which engines to use, and technology sharing. So we missed out on having our own aircraft that could also be turned into mid-air refuellers, AWACS, or maritime patrol aircraft. Now we’re buying the Airbus C-295, which is good, but it’s still a foreign plane we’re assembling, not one we designed.
- The Simple Rifle: You’d think making a reliable assault rifle would be easy. But no. The Indian INSAS rifle had problems with jamming in the cold. For over 20 years, we’ve tried to make improvements, iterate something differently, but nothing worked out. The army’s requirements were sometimes unrealistic (like wanting one rifle to fire two different kinds of bullets). At last Army started buying American SIG Sauer rifles for our frontline soldiers. And we’re now setting up a factory to make Russian AK-203s. But until recently, many Indian firms have started making assault rifles for our armed forces
For example, Dvipa Defence India Pvt. Ltd., a Hyderabad-based private firm, partnered with DRDO’s Armament Research & Development Establishment (ARDE) Pune, to develop the indigenous UGRAM rifle. It’s a modular 7.62×51 mm assault rifle designed for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Also, similarly, SSS Defence has developed a pretty good lineup of small arms for the Indian armed forces.
Why Does This Keep Happening?
- No Long-Term Vision: Governments change, priorities change. Projects get delayed for years and then cancelled. There’s no consistent funding or political will for projects that take 20-30 years to mature. Example Jet Engines need relentless commitment and resources. This is where we can learn from China, right from jet engines to programmes to their present dominance in rare earth supply chains.
- The Military Doesn’t Trust Indian Products: The Army, Air Force, and Navy(Compared to the other two branches Navy is still far better off) have seen too many quality problems from our defence factories. Can’t blame them completely here, considering for years now how Indian Ordnance Factories (now corporatised) have been inconsistent with output quality, resulting in high rates of defective ammunition and equipment. So they’d rather buy a proven foreign jet, tank, or rifle than bet on an Indian one that might have issues. However, things are changing now.
- Procurement Paralysis: The process to buy or make anything in the defence sector is insanely slow and complicated. It takes decades. Thus a need for reform in procurement policy. You can read about more here.
- Fear of Investing in Core Tech: We never spent the money to master the really hard stuff, like jet engines. We’re happy to just assemble foreign kits. This keeps us dependent forever. Hopefully, now that many private companies are entering the defence space, things can change.
The cost of all these missed opportunities is massive. We spend billions on imports, our armed forces don’t get the equipment they need on time, and we stay weak in critical technologies. We had the chance to be South Korea, but we let them slip away. Until we fix these basic system problems, the story of the next big missed opportunity might already be being written.
