Debate over a potential US–China “G2” arrangement has re-emerged in the global strategic discourse just as the world confronts disrupted supply chains, sharper great-power rivalry, and gaps in global governance. The idea, once largely theoretical, is back in political focus after President Trump publicly referenced preparing for a “G2” meeting ahead of his 2025 summit with Xi Jinping. His framing signalled an intention to explore limited cooperation with Beijing on select global issues. At the same time, his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has adopted a tougher Indo-Pacific posture—highlighting continued U.S. competition with China across security, trade, and technology. These contrasting signals have revived questions about whether Washington is considering a calibrated power-sharing framework or merely using the G2 rhetoric tactically. This piece analyzes the G2 debate, its strategic implications, and the choices it presents for India in a shifting global order.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND G2 FRAMEWORK
The G2 framework envisages a bipolar order in which the United States and China function as the key custodians steering international affairs. The idea emerged in the late 2000s, when leading geopolitical scholars argued that the world’s two largest economies possessed material capabilities and influence to stabilize an increasingly complex international system. Prominent thinkers like Fred Bergsten and Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated that structured collaboration between Washington and Beijing could offer more effective responses to financial crises, climate challenges, and broader security concerns than existing multilateral institutions. This idea got traction under the Obama administration in the aftermath of the 2008 financial collapse, when collaboration with China appeared essential for global recovery. However, this remained short-lived as deepening US-China rivalry pushed the concept to the margins. Today, renewed geopolitical uncertainty and systemic fragility have brought the G2 concept back into traction.
Nevertheless, the re-emergence of the G2 concept in global discourse showcases a lucid picture of changing geopolitical realities. Trump’s reference to G2 is seen as a tacit admission of a receding US influence in the world order. The G2 framework, if pursued, would mean Washington throwing in the towel and conceding defeat to China. This policy turnaround can be attributed to several drivers. Some see it as a consequence of the internal fracturing of the US economy, while others regard G2 as a stabilizing mechanism. A G2 arrangement would offer predictability and reduce the cost of confrontation. This comes at a time when Washington faces significant internal pressures like inflation, rising debt, supply chain security, and domestic rebuilding. Furthermore, despite decoupling rhetoric, the US and China remain deeply intertwined. Such interdependence gives more meaning to the G2, as it would manage competition without fracturing the global economy.
IMPLICATIONS OF A G2 DUOPOLY
A G2 world order won’t be anything like the Cold War era; rather, it will be far more challenging and complex. The Cold War era consisted of two peer equals dissecting the world into 2 groups; a G2 era would be more dynamic with 2 principal powers and some emerging major powers. A G2 arrangement will be one bargained between a declining power, i.e., the US, and a rising power, China, with a few economies catching up to their scale. The recently published US National Security Strategy provides a glimpse of a G2 world order envisioned by the US policymakers. The strategy is the first official US acknowledgement that the US can no longer run the world. The report stated the US retreat from global dominance to adopt a more regional approach. The US will revamp the Monroe Doctrine with a Trump corollary and seek to dominate the Western Hemisphere.
This means a G2 era would have spheres of influence with the US dominating the Western Hemisphere and China dominating the East Asian Hemisphere. The strategy outlines the fact that the US regards China as its peer power and will compete. It understands the enormous efficiency of the Chinese industrial ecosystem. Taiwan is no longer an ideological issue. Japan and South Korea too would no longer get an absolute US backing against any Chinese aggressive maneuvers. The recent hawkish statements and military posturing from China against Japan over Taiwan garnered no credible response from the US. This explains the shift in the American approach vis-à-vis its allies in case of any confrontation with China. For India, it would mean that it has to focus on cultivating domestic capacities. India must respond as a civilizational state based on its strength by building partnerships for a multipolar world with Europe, Russia, etc.
THE WAY FORWARD FOR INDIA
For India, a G2 setup would be somewhat similar to the post-Soviet disintegration era, where India had to rely on its own strengths and pave its own way without relying on anyone. Fortunately, today India has a far better footing than it did in the 1990s; however, India stands at a strategic crossroads. A US–China G2 could dilute India’s space unless New Delhi moves proactively. First and foremost, India must double down on building comprehensive national power, i.e., defense modernization, industrial capacity, etc. The objective must be to emerge as a third pole rather than a balancing state. Furthermore, New Delhi must avoid both bandwagoning and rigid non-alignment. It must institutionalize “multi-alignment” as foreign policy doctrine, not rhetoric. Practice issue-based alignments with China and the US and retain decision-making sovereignty in crises. The goal must be to be indispensable to both, subordinate to none.
CONCLUSION
The world is going through a collapse of the incumbent global system and the emergence of a new order. Amidst this phase of churning, it’s imperative for India to prepare for an uncertain future. A G2 arrangement would constrain emerging powers like India unless they actively carve out space for strategic autonomy. For India, the challenge is not to “choose sides,” but to prevent marginalization while extracting leverage from rivalry. This would require India to increase its weight economically and militarily to outgrow the duopoly. With the US and China dominating their respective hemispheres, it would greatly dilute the standing of the rest of the world. India must prepare for a G2 world by becoming too big, too central, and too resilient to be boxed into it. If the 20th century was bipolar and the early 21st unipolar, India must ensure the mid-21st is multipolar—with India as a pole.
