The military alliance between India and Pakistan is one of the most long-standing and at the same time unpredictable rivalries in the modern world, and it has gone through a radical change from the use of high-intensity conventional warfare to the complex and multi-layered setting of hybrid engagements and nuclear deterrence. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the turning point in the history of the Indian subcontinent, with the Indian forces routing the Pakistani army in a matter of weeks, leading to the establishment of Bangladesh and the surrender of one entire military command. Nuclear weapons make the current era of wars more complicated because nations now measure military rise not by territory but by how they manage the escalation ladder and sustain deterrence through technological and information superiority.
Strategic Objectives and the Definition of Victory
The concept of military victory has indicative gone through a deep transformation from the 1970s onwards. In 1971, India adopted a “total war” strategy on its eastern front, which was dictated by a humanitarian disaster and the economic burden of hosting ten million refugees. India made it clear that the goal was nothing less than the complete dislocation of the Pakistani military’s eastern wing and the capture of Dhaka. To achieve this, there had to be a coordinated, three-pronged assault by nine infantry divisions, supported by armored units and air power, leading to the largest military surrender since World War II. The victory was total, with a permanent changing of the South Asian power map consequently.
The year 2026 is approaching and with it comes the need for a more refined approach as per the strategic landscape. With the “Dynamic Response Strategy,” India is now trying to make room for limited conflict under nuclear threshold. The goal of modern-day operations such as Operation Sindoor is not to acquire land but to carry out punitive strikes on particular terrorist infrastructure and military installations to re-establish deterrence. In the contemporary context, nations understand victory as escalation dominance—the ability to strike the opponent’s core areas while countering retaliation through superior air defenses and electronic warfare.
The Catalyst: Humanitarian Crisis vs. Counter-Terrorism
The causes of wars have been shifting from large political scandals to small, localized incidents that can quickly turn up the heat. The 1971 war was the direct result of the systematic discrimination against the Bengali people in East Pakistan that followed the 1970 elections. The eventual military operation, Operation Searchlight, that led to the slaughter of many and caused the outflow of millions into India, which forced India to bear an economic and social burden that necessitated military action. India’s response was a reaction to a major humanitarian and demographic threat to its internal stability.
Today a terrorist act committed across the border usually triggers the response, setting already-planned military action into motion. The Pahalgam attack in April—when militants killed twenty-six Indian civilians- is considered the primary cause of the 2025 conflict. Unlike the slow build-up of 1971, where India matured its strategy for months, the response in 2025 was rapid and targeted specific terror organizations such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. This shift reflects a “new normal” where India no longer views diplomatic restraint as the default posture but instead prioritizes immediate, visible retaliation to satisfy domestic political demands and signal military resolve.
Evolution of Land Warfare: From Massed Armor to Sensor-Integrated Systems
In 1971, the ground battles were mainly fought by armored and infantry units clashing in the great expanses of Punjab and the Thar Desert. The Battle of Longewala still shines as a great example of this period when a small number of Indian soldiers of the Punjab Regiment with the help of Hawker Hunter planes wiped out a big unit of Pakistan’s armor. Infantry’s courage was the main factor behind land warfare and the tank’s mechanical durability was like the T-55 and Sherman. The defensive forces were fixed and the supply lines were slow and dependent on the rail and road networks that were already in place.
The modern land warfare has moved to a very digitized and automatic battlefield. Although there is still some role for armored troops, things have changed to a large extent. Besides a multitude of munitions, drone swarms, and integrated sensor networks, the battlefields are now all loitering. The 2025 conflict is characterized by the use of “shoot and scoot” missile systems, like the Fatah series, and ground drones for both reconnaissance and precision targeting. The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in targeting cycles enables real-time target acquisition thereby significantly reducing the “Observe-Orient-Decide-Act” (OODA) loop compared to the 1971 period.
Main Battle Tanks: Indigenous Programs and Technological Asymmetry
The armored struggle between the two countries has undergone a remarkable transformation turning from the importation of cold-war-era tanks to the usage of advanced home-made and heavily modified platforms. India’s Arjun MK-2 and Pakistan’s Al-Khalid are two opposite sides of the coin in terms of armored vehicle design philosophy. The former, Arjun, being a “heavyweight” platform, emphasizes protection and firepower using Kanchan composite armor and a one-of-a-kind 120mm rifled gun that only the elite Western tanks have. Al-Khalid, however, is a light vehicle representing a faster and more mobile approach, reflecting the Pakistani requirement of tactical flexibility in its varied terrains.
On the one hand, the Al-Khalid agility comes at the cost of the Arjun’s fire control and thermal imaging, which provide a decisive advantage over the Al-Khalid in the western front open desert where it can shoot at a target before the enemy gets close. In contrast, both countries have started to deal with the rising problem of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and loitering munitions, which have made the traditional tank formations more exposed even than during the 1971 desert campaigns.
The Modern Infantryman: Network-Centric Combat
The typical infantryman of 1971 carried very simple and basic equipment: a steel helmet, a canvas webbing, and a 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifle (SLR). Communication depended on cumbersome line-of-sight radios, and without night-vision devices, armies could barely operate after sunset. By 2026, the Indian Army would have moved over completely to the Futuristic Infantry Soldier As a System (F-INSAS) model. This modernization program will integrate the soldier into the digital battlefield and will also provide modular weapons such as the SIG716 and AK-203, lightweight ballistic armor, and helmet-mounted visors equipped with thermal sensors and heads-up displays (HUD).
The Pakistani army still has the G3 rifle in its inventory. Despite its age, the German-designed 7.62x51mm rifle gets compliments for its reliability as well as stopping power in comparison with more modern weapons in trials. The current Pakistani soldier, however, is more reliant on night vision equipment and drones at the squad level for surveillance which is indicative of the transitioning of warfare into the “intelligentized” style. High-altitude warfare in places like Siachen and the Kargil heights has made it obligatory to have a combined approach of specific equipment and training, as now both armies are keeping manned posts at over 20,000 feet which is a level of endurance that was technologically and logistically impossible during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.
Aerial Supremacy: From Dogfights to BVR and Standoff Strikes
In the 1971 war, the air force was used mainly for support of the ground troops and protection of the airspace. The Indian Air Force (IAF) declared complete air control in the eastern front by the 10th of December, putting the PAF’s single unit of F-86 Sabres on the ground effectively. This allowed the IAF to execute the Tangail airdrop, and target Pakistan’s command centers with no restrictions, thus speeding up the fall of Dhaka. Air combat once meant MiG-21s and Sabres twisting in visual-range dogfights where pilot skill decided everything.
Now, battles are fought BVR, guided by AEW&C platforms that prioritise detection, data-linking, and first-shot advantage over manoeuvring. The 2025 war was an instance of “jet-era dogfight” on a wide scale, with more than 120 aircrafts at standoff distances. The encounter of India’s Rafales and Su-30MKIs with Pakistan’s J-10Cs and JF-17s exhibited the dominance of missile technology and electronic warfare suites. A significant development in 2025 was the performance of the Chinese-supplied PL-15 air-to-air missile, which allegedly outranged India’s BVR assets, highlighting the growing technological challenge posed by the China-Pakistan military alliance.
The Normalization of Air Power as a Punitive Tool
One of the major shifts during the post-Cold War era and the third world war period is the use of air power during crises in different countries without any restrictions. In 1971, an airstrike was synonymous with war. Today, air power serves as a precision instrument for limited, time-bound retaliation. Balakot (2019) and Operation Sindoor (2025) exemplify this shift—missions calibrated to deliver political signalling with start and end points defined purely by strategic timing. Moreover, India is using the SCALP missile and Hammer bombs for high-precision targeting of the infrastructure while trying to control the escalation ladder, which is a tactic that depends on the “normalization” of air violations that would have ignited a total war in the 1970s.
Maritime Strategy: From Harbor Strikes to Blue-Water Presence
The naval battle of 1971 was famous for being the perfect example of offensive maritime strategy. Admiral S.M. Nanda led the Indian Navy and changed its strategy from purely defensive to an aggressive one, aiming at “bottling up” the Pakistan Navy within Karachi. The Trident operation, conducted on December 4, was a major naval operation that employed Soviet Osa-class missile boats to hit the Karachi harbor leading to the sinking of the destroyer PNS Khaiber, the minesweeper PNS Muhafiz, and the destruction of the oil and fuel supplies. The Indian dominance in the Arabian Sea became fully established through this operation, followed by Operation Python, which cut off the eastern front of Pakistani forces.
(via Financial Express)
The events from 2023 to 2025 show that battles for control of the maritime domain are now fought in a multipolar environment involving carrier groups and submarines. The Indian navy has progressed by leaps and bounds in becoming an all-weather blue-water force that neither belongs to the Western nor Eastern alliances but rather operates on the basis of the two aircraft carriers – INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya – which in turn, allows to control the power dynamics in the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR). On the other hand, Pakistan has now adopted a “sea denial” strategy and is concentrating on its submarine fleet in addition to enhancing deterrence against the Indian naval blockade through developing sea-based second-strike capabilities such as the Babur-III cruise missile.
The Invisible Domain: Electronic and Cyber Warfare
One of the most significant changes from 1971 onwards is that the electromagnetic spectrum has become a major area of conflict. In 1971, electronic warfare was almost non-existent, while communication depended on physical wires and rudimentary radio signals. By 2025, the success of kinetic operations was often reliant on the ability to jam the enemy’s radar, disrupt their C2 networks, and mislead GPS navigation.
Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems
The development of the Samyukta and Himshakti systems by India is indicative of a gigantic step forward in electronic warfare capability.
- Samyukta System: This very large system based on a hundred and forty-five ground mobile vehicles gives the whole electromagnetic spectrum a thorough view and hearing. It is very intelligent and can intercept and jam all the communication and radar signals from High Frequency to Millimeter Wave (MMW). So, it can blind the enemy ground forces by cutting off communications between tanks and artillery observers.
- Himshakti System: A lighter system that is more advanced and well-suited for a mountain region; Himshakti can jam frequency ranges in a 10,000 square kilometer area. The system comprises elements of satellite and mobile phone interception that will not allow the Indian Army to lose control of the information along the Line of Control.
Pakistan has reacted to these developments by forming its cyber and electronic warfare units in concert with its own, therefore, using the locally made Link-17 secure data link to combat jamming from Indian forces and still hold a tight-knit combat network. The cyber-attacks on state-owned banks and media centers during the 2025 war were clear indicators that the new “frontline” not only comprised but also included the civilian digital infrastructure.
Conflicting Nuclear Doctrines
The most vital aspect that has happened since 1971 is the making of the continent a nuclear zone. The war of 1971 was fought with the understanding that a defeat in conventional warfare would not lead to an extinction-level nuclear catastrophe. The two states have been using the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) strategy since the 1998 nuclear tests, which has played a significant role in the handing over of the era of large-scale conventional wars.
Now the present unstable state of South Asia is the result of a delicate equilibrium between two totally different nuclear stances.
- India’s Doctrine: India firmly believes in the publicly announced “No first Use” (NFU) policy, which focuses on “Credible Minimum Deterrence” and a pledge to “Massive Retaliation” against any nuclear attack. For this reason, India has built a nuclear triad that can survive and includes Agni-V ICBMs and Arihant-class nuclear submarines.
- Pakistan’s Doctrine: Pakistan disapproves of NFU and presents a “Full Spectrum Deterrence” that targets India’s conventional strength. Among these, Pakistan develops Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) such as the Nasr missile for battlefield use to stop a conventional Indian advance.
This gap in doctrines creates a “stability-instability paradox” where large-scale war does not occur, but lower-level skirmishes and hybrid tactics are encouraged. The crisis of 2025 alarmingly got the region to the nuclear threshold, as attacks on sensitive locations and the use of ballistic missiles in the conventional role reduced the escalatory space.
Information Warfare and the Battle of Perception
In 1971, the dissemination of information happened mainly via state-controlled radio and the newspapers that reported the events with a delay. The sheer number of 93,000 captured soldiers and the signing of the Instrument of Surrender in Dhaka dictated the war’s tale, serving as undeniable physical proof of victory. In the 21st century, the “battle of perception” shifted to the digital age, where speed and reach overshadow the truth in shaping the narrative.
“Information Warfare” (IW) describes modern conflicts in which both countries use AI-generated content, bot networks, and various social media tools to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad. The crisis of 2025 showed how social media escalated tensions by spreading false information about aircraft losses and demanding “total war.” Pakistan has made IW a part of its national security strategy to influence international perception even when its military or economic power is limited. This “asymmetry in informational posture” exposes a major weakness for India, whose strategic communication often remains reactive and fragmented and therefore fails to deliver an effective response.
What Hasn’t Changed: Territorial Disputes and Proxy Warfare
Despite the huge technological and doctrinal changes, the main factors of the conflict are still very much the same. The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is still the main point of contention, and the heavily militarized Line of Control (LoC) is still the most unstable border in the world. The deep-seated mistrust between the two countries is such that any minor incident can easily develop into a full-blown regional crisis.
Additionally, the use of irregular forces is still very common in the conflict. In 1971, India made use of the Mukti Bahini as a force multiplier to carry out sabotages and gather intelligence. Pakistan is said to use proxy groups and “hybrid terrorists” to keep appearing peripherally in Kashmir while avoiding an open war it cannot bear economically. The techniques have changed—now drones rather than foot couriers carry weapons and narcotics across the border—but the fundamental strategy of employing asymmetrical actors to accomplish strategic goals continues to characterize South Asian warfare.
