Precision, Paranoia, and Proxy War: What’s Behind the ULFA(I) Drone Attack Story?
ULFA (I) or United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent) claimed that Indian Army drone attacks had taken the lives of a total 19 of their members and injured 19 as well. The critical issue was that it had allegedly killed 3 of its leaders – Lieutenant General Nayan Medhi, Brigadier Ganesh Lahon and Colonel Pradip Gogoi. Indian Armed Forces have strictly denied any such attacks on the ULFA(I) and RPF outfits, by releasing an official statement through the mouthpiece of Lt Colonel Mahendra Rawat, Public Relations Officer Defence, Guwahati.
Allegations and Clarifications
Paresh Baruah, the co-founder of the ULFA (I) has been unstirred and confident in his claims of Indian attacks. He pinpointed his allegations by saying that Kamikaze drones and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles manufactured in Israel and France were used in the operation by the Indian Army and launched from multiple centers along the border. He also specified that the attacks were performed in two ULFA (I) camps and one PLA camp – specifically the RPF wing of the same were attacked between 0230 and 0430 hours on early morning of July 13, 2025.
The attacks were allegedly targeted in the camps of Sagaing Region (Myanmar), where the key ULFA(I) bases were at Waktham Basti, Hoyat Basti, and Hakiyot near Arunachal’s Longding district. Some camps are near Pangmi Naga areas and the China–Myanmar border. Manipur-based groups like PLA, KYKL, and PREPAK also have camps nearby. The NSCN-K(YA) faction is based in Naga-inhabited areas of Sagaing, typically within 6–10 km of other camps.
As reported by Pratidin Times, Assam’s Chief Minister, Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma said “We have no official information about any strike. The Assam Police is not involved and no operation has been carried out from our soil. Whatever we know is based on Paresh Baruah’s public statement”.
This makes the situation stand in a questionable position where the opinions are divided, the reality and the claims raise the need of digging into the past to analyse the probable causes of the event.
The ULFA(I) Backstory
Origins and Objectives
The ULFA was founded on 7 April 1979 in Sivasagar, Assam, by a group of young Assamese men including Paresh Baruah and Arabinda Rajkhowa. The organisation sought to establish a sovereign and independent state of Assam for the indigenous Assamese population. It emerged in response to widespread regional discontent and perceived neglect by the central Indian government.
Designation and Status
ULFA was designated a terrorist organisation by the Indian government in 1990 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Internationally, it is listed by the United States Department of State under “other groups of concern.” Despite the ban, ULFA operated underground and maintained regional influence for decades.
Decline and Loss of Public Support
Although ULFA enjoyed popular support in its early years, particularly in the Brahmaputra Valley, this eroded over time due to its involvement in extortion, arms smuggling, and indiscriminate violence. Thousands of civilians were killed or displaced in the conflict, leading to growing disillusionment among the public. Intensified security operations further diminished the group’s influence.
Cross-Border Sanctuaries
ULFA maintained training camps and safe havens in Bangladesh and Bhutan until the early 2000s. Operation All Clear in 2003, led by the Royal Bhutan Army with Indian support, dismantled its camps in Bhutan. In 2004, Bangladeshi authorities seized a major arms consignment in Chittagong linked to Paresh Baruah, who then fled to China’s Yunnan Province.
Peace Talks and Internal Divisions
Following arrests of key leaders in 2009, ULFA signaled readiness for dialogue. In 2010, it dropped the demand for independence as a precondition for talks. A “Suspension of Operations” agreement was signed in 2011 with the Indian and Assam governments. However, a hardline faction led by Paresh Baruah, now known as ULFA(I), rejected the talks and continued armed operations. In the recent talks, Baruah openly declined all the claims of dialogue of the Indian Government with the organisation, which says that no such truce talks have been initiated since the last 4 years.
Secret Killings Controversy
Between 1998 and 2001, a series of extrajudicial killings targeted families of ULFA militants in Assam, allegedly orchestrated by the state government under AGP leader Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. The victims included Paresh Baruah’s brother and five relatives of ULFA spokesperson Mithinga Daimary. The 2007 Saikia Commission Report concluded that surrendered ULFA cadres carried out the killings under police direction.
Operation Golden Bird (1995)
In March 1995 (lasted up to 3 months), Indian intelligence agencies reported that about 200 insurgents from ULFA, PLA, and ATTF were moving arms from Bangladesh to Manipur, initially believed to be NSCN(IM). Support came from Chin insurgent factions and groups like NUPA and Shanti Bahini, with stockpiling reported along the Indo–Myanmar border, particularly near Cox’s Bazar and Parva in North Mizoram.
On 1 April 1995, reports confirmed the group had entered Indian territory via the Bangladesh–India–Myanmar tri-junction. Assam Rifles and BSF verified the movement through arrests and surveillance, tracking the group’s path northward across Mizoram toward Manipur, following known insurgent trafficking routes.
At the time, troop presence in Mizoram was minimal, with only Assam Rifles units available and no regular army deployments. Due to peace in Mizoram and the army’s focus on Kashmir, no contingency plan existed, exposing vulnerabilities as insurgent activity surged in neighbouring northeastern states.
The detailed account on the entire situation has been described well in this paper by Rumel Dahiya on the operation published under Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Operation Hot Pursuit (2015)
When we get to dive into the insurgency situation of the ULFA(I), NSCN and KYA, Operation Hot Pursuit deserves its mention.
On 9 June 2015, the Indian Army launched Operation Hot Pursuit, a cross-border strike into Myanmar targeting NSCN-K insurgents, in retaliation for a deadly ambush on 4 June that killed 18 soldiers of the 6 Dogra Regiment in Manipur’s Chandel district. Around 72 commandos from the 21 PARA (SF), equipped with advanced weaponry and night vision gear, carried out the operation based on precise intelligence, reportedly from an agent codenamed Lima.
The commandos entered Myanmar after trekking 50 kilometers through dense jungle, striking two insurgent camps—one each of NSCN-K and KYKL—located near the Nagaland and Manipur borders, including near Ukhrul. The teams were split into assault and perimeter groups to ensure no insurgents escaped. The actual assault lasted about 40 minutes, during which Indian reports claimed that approximately 38 insurgents were killed. Mi-17 helicopters were kept on standby for emergency evacuation.
The Indian Army later stated that the operation had been coordinated with Myanmar, citing historic military cooperation, though Myanmar officially denied authorizing any cross-border strike. The operation was widely viewed as a turning point in India’s counter-insurgency strategy, sending a strong message to northeast insurgent groups about India’s willingness to pursue cross-border threats with precision and force. The operation ended on 21 May, 1995.
Operation Sunrise (2019)
Operation Sunrise was a joint military effort carried out in 2019 by the Indian Army and Myanmar’s Tatmadaw to target insurgent camps along the India–Myanmar border. Conducted in two phases—Operation Sunrise I and II—the operation aimed to eliminate militant bases posing a threat to regional stability and to safeguard strategic initiatives like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. This marked a significant step in strengthening military cooperation between India and Myanmar to combat cross-border insurgency.
Burmese Coup d’etat (2021)
On 1 February 2021, Tatmadaw staged a coup, overthrowing the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government just before the new Parliament was to convene. Power was transferred to Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, and a year-long state of emergency was declared, with the military rejecting the results of the 2020 general election and promising fresh elections later.
Key NLD leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, were detained and charged under politically motivated accusations. In the following months, widespread anti-coup protests erupted, met with violent crackdowns by the junta, sparking an armed resistance led by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) under the National Unity Government.
As of March 2024, over 50,000 people had been killed, including thousands of civilians and children, with more than 26,000 arrested. The junta executed four pro-democracy activists in 2022, introduced compulsory military service in 2024, and granted amnesty to over 9,000 prisoners during the 76th Independence Day in January 2024.
This serves as an indirect connection to the claims, as this one event has changed the relation how the new military government by the Tatmadaw interacts with forces of other countries and the internal insurgent groups for suppressing the anti-coup uprising yet remaining ethical in the global stage.
Who Did It Then?
When analysed in a logical manner, and understanding the temperament of the Myanmar government, insurgent groups and pro-democracy protesters – many questions arise, and the doubts have been righteously raised in an article by The Diplomat.
Is it the Indian Army?
Yes, maybe. The Indian army has always been instrumental in reducing the borderside risk and suppression of the insurgent groups, starting from Operation Golden Bird itself. Moreover, the direct involvement of the KYA of the Kachin Movement and presence of PLA in the guise of RPF also makes it a bit concerning while thinking from India’s perspective, hence the attacks maybe from their end.
Is it Tatmadaw (Military of Myanmar)?
Still, maybe. The Tatmadaw is no more acting like a military under a democratic government. It is now holding the helm of a legally arguable martial government, who now has to be on good terms with the insurgents who are its indirect henchmen in suppression of any public outrage against them with the virtue of unsolicited weapon, manpower and training facility.
On a broader scale, a government has to be on good terms with the country’s army it shares its own border with. The Tatmadaw has been with the Indian Army to suppress groups such as ULFA, NSCN, KYA, RPF, etc. now cannot make its switcheroo stance too obvious as a government. Thus, there are two possibilities.
First, Myanmar military may be involved in the attack – which is highly unlikely for it to instigate a new issue for groups they are sided by in pro-democratic suppression.
Second, they may have had the intel regarding the attacks – but they intentionally deterred from informing the groups, to passively side the Indian Army for an international support as a government.
Is it another group?
Rare possibility. Sagaing and the entire region lacks any known anti-ULFA or PLA resistance presence, making it a relatively uncontested zone for insurgent activity. It remains remote, underdeveloped, and sparsely populated, which further limits state surveillance and control. Additionally, the challenging terrain and limited infrastructure pose significant logistical and tactical constraints, especially in deploying and sustaining over 150 drones or similar advanced surveillance assets.
Conclusion
The alleged drone strike on ULFA(I) camps has exposed a familiar fault line—where insurgency, cross-border politics, and denial diplomacy intersect. Paresh Baruah’s bold claims, India’s firm denials, and Myanmar’s silence form a triangle of uncertainty that echoes past operations and present-day power plays. This can be probably a seed to likely border tension – no one knows where this can roll, as Baruah wants to avenge for the losses.
Whether this was a calculated strike or crafted narrative, the incident signals a deeper strategic contest playing out in the shadows—where insurgent sanctuaries, fragile alliances, and covert cooperation continue to define the security landscape of the region. The fog of war, it seems, is thicker than ever.
