PLA Day 2025: Is China’s Army Battle-Ready or Hollowed by Politics?

On the 1st of August every year, the PLA Day, officially known as Chinese People’s Liberation Army Day, in the People’s Republic of China is celebrated to commemorate the founding of the PLA. The date marks the Nanchang Uprising (1927), the first major armed rebellion led by the Communist Party of China (CPC) against the Nationalist forces (KMT). On June 30, 1933, six years after the uprising, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee for Military Revolutionary Cases voted to establish August 1 as an annual holiday. This declaration was subsequently made official by the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on July 11, 1933. To know more about the PLA Day, read here.

This article is not a history class on the uprisings and the conflicts of the previous century, but the issues that lie within the PLA modernization policies, recruitment strategies and the slow fade out of the word “people” from the PLA. A discussion on visible facts over whispered theories – discussing PLA with the PLA day around the corner.

The Blurred “P” in the PLA

Recruitment Issue

The PLA has undertaken wide-ranging recruitment reforms aimed at closing its talent gap. A key component has been increasing the intake of students with STEM backgrounds into military academies. The PLA now actively recruits from technical colleges and civilian universities, targeting graduates with expertise in engineering, cyber, aerospace, and other high-tech fields. This marks a significant shift from traditional recruitment patterns that prioritized infantry and artillery roles.

The transformation is also reflected in the educational profile of new recruits. Anecdotal data suggests that 70–75% of incoming personnel now possess some level of post-secondary education. This evolving demographic represents a deliberate effort to prepare the force for more complex operational environments. However, integrating this new talent into the PLA’s rigid and hierarchical structure remains an ongoing challenge. Modern War Institute delves deeply into the issue of experience gaps along with the additional leadership lacuna, which is discussed in this article later on. 

Retention Issue

While recruitment numbers have improved, retention continues to be the PLA’s most pressing personnel issue. One major factor is the under-utilization of skilled recruits, many of whom find themselves assigned to roles far below their qualifications. Civilian-trained officers, once brought in through programs similar to the U.S. ROTC, often faced systemic discrimination within the force. These officers were perceived as inferior by academy-trained peers, ultimately leading to the cancellation of such integration efforts.

Service conditions further contribute to attrition. Personnel stationed in remote or harsh environments—such as radar operators in Xinjiang—report low morale, poor living standards, and minimal support. Meanwhile, China’s booming tech sector offers competitive salaries, better work-life balance, and clear paths for advancement, drawing talent away from military service. The PLA’s recent attempts to extend NCO service terms and allow re-enlistment for ex-servicemen reflect its struggle to retain experienced and technically skilled personnel.

China’s Twisted Modernization Machinery for PLA

Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Purge

China’s military leadership has entered a period of acute instability, marked by purges, disappearances, and deepening political scrutiny. Since quashing rumors of his own investigation by appearing at a Shanghai forum in December 2024, Defense Minister Dong Jun has kept a cautious profile. Yet his exclusion from the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue—an unprecedented snub—has cast doubt on his standing within the Central Military Commission (CMC). While he remains in office, Dong’s role in defense diplomacy now operates under a cloud of uncertainty.

The situation escalated with the formal expulsion of Admiral Miao Hua in March 2025 for “serious violations of discipline and law.” Miao, who headed the CMC’s Political Work Department, was instrumental in shaping personnel decisions. His downfall was soon followed by the removal of PLA Navy Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Li Hanjun and the unexplained disappearance of CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong. These high-level removals signal a deepening purge within PLA ranks.

Now in its second wave, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has taken down more than twenty senior officers. Officially framed as a cleanup effort, the campaign appears designed to eliminate rival power centers and consolidate Xi’s personal control over the armed forces.

Impact on Morale and Command Climate

The rapid succession of disciplinary actions has instilled widespread apprehension within the officer corps. Observers describe a “reign by terror” where officers risk investigation for mere association with purged figures or for overzealous execution of directives. Such an environment stifles initiative, erodes frank debate, and fosters a culture of risk aversion that undermines the development of confident, professional leadership at all levels.

Operational Readiness and Strategic Planning

Leadership churn has disrupted long-term force development and joint-training programs. The PLA’s freshly revised “Common Regulations” enacted April 1, 2025, emphasize “conscious discipline” but do little to restore trust across branches. Frequent vacancies in senior posts have delayed critical modernization initiatives and weakened jointness, as officers now hesitate to engage in cross-departmental cooperation lest they be accused of factionalism. This friction hampers the PLA’s ability to execute complex operations, leaving it organizationally brittle despite impressive surface-level modernization.

Continuation of Xi’s Self-Revolution Drive

Xi Jinping shows no sign of halting the purge in 2025. Recent directives have launched a new ideological mobilization campaign, framing ongoing investigations as part of the CCP’s “self-revolution” to root out dissent under the guise of reform. Loyalty and political obedience remain the paramount criteria for promotion, overshadowing merit and competence. Further probes are expected, likely reaching into networks connected to Miao Hua and other once-trusted loyalists.

Strategic Trade-Off: Loyalty versus Professionalism

Xi’s prioritization of loyalty has reshaped the PLA into a politically compliant but institutionally fragile force. The prospect that no one—regardless of past service or proximity to power—is immune from scrutiny has intensified anxiety across the ranks. In a system governed by fear and control, operational effectiveness, morale, and cohesion are the silent casualties of a campaign driven more by political survival than by genuine military reform.

How Hollow is the PLA Power?

From the earlier section it is clearly evident that the modernization and the anti-corruption reforms have curbed the confidence and the morale of the PLA. Despite outward signs of strength, the PLA’s resilience appears increasingly performative. Xi Jinping’s purges, ideological controls, and revival of Mao-era practices reveal a deep mistrust in the military’s competence and loyalty.

Yoram Evron, Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and Political Science at the University of Haifa, points out in his article that while modernisation continues on paper, internal dysfunction, corruption, and politicisation undermine effectiveness. Xi’s preference for deterrence over direct conflict reflects an awareness that the PLA may falter under real wartime pressure. 

China’s Combat Avoidance

Timothy R. Heath, a distinguished senior defence researcher at RAND Corporation, dives into insights and questions the PLA’s capability, whether it is a paper dragon in its core.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has rapidly modernized and boasts impressive weaponry, rivaling the U.S. in some areas. However, despite its advanced equipment, the PLA’s true combat readiness and ability to effectively fight a major war remain uncertain and largely unproven. Historical and recent evidence suggest that military capability on paper does not automatically translate into battlefield success.

Fundamentally, the PLA serves as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), prioritizing political loyalty and regime survival over battlefield effectiveness. Its organisational structure, political commissars, and party committees emphasize ideological control and loyalty, often at the expense of flexibility, initiative, and pure combat competence. Large portions of training focus on political indoctrination rather than realistic warfighting skills.

“There is no evidence that the country is mobilizing for war or otherwise putting itself on a war footing.”

Timothy R Heath on Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness via RAND

Chinese leaders show little interest or urgency in preparing for a high-intensity war, including over Taiwan. The PLA has made minimal public or military preparations for such a conflict. Taiwan’s importance to CCP legitimacy is likely overstated; Beijing prefers a patient, peaceful approach to unification, avoiding high-risk military confrontation which could threaten regime stability.

As China faces economic and social challenges, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will grow even more dominant, pushing combat readiness further down the priority list. 

The PLA’s modernization supports national pride, deterrence, and nonwar missions like disaster relief, but political control and regime security fundamentally shape its development. This leads to a military more akin to forces focused on regime survival than on waging decisive conventional war.

Conclusion

PLA is a strong armed force indeed, yet some of the claims and the actions of PLA have always been contradictory to each other. The deeper analysis, into the situation and tumult PLA is going through, defines a whole new perspective to the issues lying underneath. The hollowing of the PLA is evident from various standpoints and the recovery, quite farfetched from what the country is projecting in the world stage