Why is India Not Choosing Russia As a Domestic Jet Engine Partner?

Jet engines are the beating heart of modern combat aircraft. Designing and manufacturing them is one of the most complex technological challenges in aerospace engineering, requiring mastery over advanced metallurgy, aerodynamics, thermal management, and digital control systems. India, with its long-term goal of defence self-reliance under Atmanirbhar Bharat, has been pushing to indigenize jet engine development.

While Russia has historically been India’s closest defence partner and did provide support in some areas, New Delhi has become increasingly cautious about selecting Moscow as a core collaborator for next-generation engine programs. Instead, India is exploring deeper partnerships with Western engine makers such as GE (USA), Safran (France), and Rolls- Royce (UK).

• India’s shift away from deeper reliance on Russian jet-engine technology is driven by
• Long-standing technical failure and delay in building an indigenous engine (the Kaveri/GTRE story),
• Supply-chain and sanctions risk exposed by the Russia–Ukraine war,
• A strategic choice to partner with Western OEMs (GE, Safran etc.) that offer performance, transfer-of-technology and industrial tie-ups, and
• Deliberate Indian policy (Make-in-India + DRDO/private participation) to build an indigenous propulsion ecosystem.

Russia’s Role in Indian Jet Engine Programs

• Kaveri Project Testing- Russia’s CIAM (Central Institute of Aviation Motors) provided test facilities for India’s indigenous Kaveri engine. Although helpful, this remained largely limited to performance testing and did not involve transfer of design know-how.
• Joint Fighter Projects- In earlier programs such as the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), Russia’s unwillingness to share detailed engine technologies— including source codes and design data—was one of the sticking points that contributed to India pulling out.
• Transport Aircraft Programs- Disputes over engine choices in Indo-Russian transport aircraft projects further highlighted recurring issues over performance, life- cycle costs, and India’s demand for deeper autonomy.

Why India is Not Choosing Russia ?

Limited Technology Transfer

India’s top priority is full access to core technologies—including turbine cores, advanced materials, and FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) software. Russian firms have consistently offered only partial sharing, keeping India dependent on Moscow for upgrades and spares.

Performance Deficiencies

Russian engines, while rugged, have historically lagged in thrust-to-weight ratios, fuel efficiency, and service life compared to Western designs. The Kaveri program, despite Russian testing assistance, could not meet the Indian Air Force’s performance benchmarks for the Tejas fighter.

Reliability and Maintenance Costs

Russian jet engines generally require shorter service intervals and more frequent overhauls, raising lifetime operating costs. Western designs typically offer longer mean time between overhauls and a more mature global support ecosystem—factors crucial for the Indian Air Force’s operational readiness.

Sanctions and Geopolitical Risks

Ongoing sanctions on Russia restrict access to advanced materials, software, and precision manufacturing tools that often originate in the West. This adds significant long-term risk if India ties its critical engine programs to Russian supply chains. The Russia–Ukraine war and subsequent sanctions regimes created practical risks (spare parts, payments, shipping) for defence supply chains. Indian planners saw vulnerability in relying on Russian propulsion and critical parts when global sanctions/military friction could disrupt flows. Recent analyses of Russo-Indian defence ties discuss growing limits and trade-offs.

Strategic Autonomy

India wants to build and export its own aircraft without being constrained by foreign vetoes or opaque licensing regimes. Russia’s reluctance to hand over full intellectual property rights undermines this goal.

Why the West?

India is now moving towards GE (F404/F414 family) and partnering with Safran for propulsion work for future fighters (Tejas Mk2/AMCA) — offering proven engines and faster operational timelines. Recent reporting shows negotiations / deals to acquire/produce F404/F414 engines and DRDO–Safran collaboration to develop engines in India. Example- Open-source reports on follow-on F404 deliveries and DRDO-Safran AMCA engine cooperation.

• Safran (France)- Reportedly open to joint development with significant technology transfer, particularly in hot-section metallurgy and turbine design.
• GEAerospace(USA)-Already powering India’s Tejas with the F404 and committed to supplying F414 engines for the upcoming Tejas Mk2. Talks are ongoing for greater local manufacturing.
• Rolls-Royce (UK)- Exploring co-development opportunities in adaptive-cycle engines and digital control systems.

These companies are positioning themselves not just as suppliers but as potential co- creators of India’s engine ecosystem.

The Bigger Picture

The shift away from Russia is not a reflection of weakened bilateral ties but a recalibration of priorities. India still sources critical systems from Russia—S-400 air defence systems, nuclear submarines, and Su-30MKI upgrades—but when it comes to jet engines, strategic self-reliance, cutting-edge performance, and freedom from sanctions risks outweigh legacy partnerships.

Overview-India’sJetEngineAmbitions&Russia’sRole

• India has been developing its indigenous jet engine project called Kaveri (by GTRE/ DRDO) since the 1980s. It was intended initially to power the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas.
• Russia has supported India in certain aspects- providing testing facilities (e.g. through the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM)), cooperation in some technical testing, possibly sharing some design assistance. But full technology transfer of critical elements has been limited.
• India is now looking at Western engine makers (USA’s GE, France’s Safran, UK’s Rolls Royce etc.) as partners for its future engines (for example for the AMCA – Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft).

Key Reasons

Why India is Hesitant/Reluctant to Choose Russia as Partner

Here are the main technical, strategic, and geopolitical reasons—drawn from recent reporting, analysis, and India’s experience—that help explain why India is not simply going with Russia for a fresh or upgraded engine partnership.

Specific Case Studies/ Illustrations

• Kaveri engine– Despite decades of work, testing (some in Russia), etc., the engine didn’t meet the needed performance metrics for the LCA Tejas, and weight/fuel efficiency penalties were significant. This forced India to use an imported engine (GE F404) to meet timelines and performance requirements.
• FGFA / Stealth Fighter Project– At one point, India was in talks with Russia on a 5th-generation fighter (sometimes called FGFA). But disagreements over engine capabilities, inability to get a next-gen engine from Russia that met India’s expectations, and refusal by Russia to share critical data (source codes, etc.) scuttled the project.
• MTA/Transport Aircraft Projects– In some multirole transport or airframe projects, engine choice has been a dispute point- the Indian Air Force demanding features like FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control), good after-sales support, low maintenance, etc.—features where some Russian engines have lagged or where Russia has been unwilling to share certain systems or permit upgrades without dependence.

Why Western Partners Are More Attractive

Given the limitations above, here’s why India is turning more towards Western players.

• Higher likelihood of deep tech transfer– Companies like Safran are reportedly offering more ambitious technology transfer in design & development than what Russia has typically been willing to share.
• Better testing/industrial ecosystems– Western firms already have experience and networks for high-precision manufacturing, advanced materials, supply chain, and broader global service support. This helps reduce risks regarding reliability, certification, maintenance over lifetime.
• Regulatory and export compliance– Western engines often satisfy certain international certifications or norms that help in export potential of aircraft, availability of parts, and lighter exposure to sanction risks.
• Performance & lifetime– The engine specifications (thrust-to-weight ratio, fuel efficiency, reliability, time between overhauls) with Western engines are attractive, plus the broader maintenance infrastructure globally is more mature.

Drawbacks/Risks in Choosing Western Partners Too

For completeness- the Western route is not without its own trade-offs.

• Western companies may also resist full transfer of certain “crown jewels” (e.g. metallurgy, source codes).
• Licencing costs or royalty burdens can be high.
• Export / import of certain parts or technology may still be constrained by export control regimes (ITAR, etc.).
• Political pressure or dependencies might arise.

Insights on the Statement

Not Punishment, but Pragmatism

• Unlike the West, India has not used sanctions or political pressure against Russia – it continues to buy oil and spare parts.
• However, cancellations of defense projects are rooted in performance, delivery delays, and uncertainty rather than ideological opposition.
• Example- Projects like the Ka-226T light helicopter deal and discussions on IL-276 transport aircraft stalled because Russia couldn’t meet timelines or localization demands, not because India wanted to punish Moscow.

Insight- India is separating politics from procurement — it values Russia as a partner but won’t risk operational readiness on unreliable deliveries.

Structural Weakness in Russia’s Defense Industry

• The Ukraine war has redirected Russian defense industrial capacity inward, prioritizing its own military.
• Sanctions have cut Russia off from high-tech imports (e.g., semiconductors, precision machining tools, composite materials).
• Result- Long delays in contracts — e.g., delivery slippages for S-400 regiments, Talwar-class frigates (Project 11356), and spares for Su-30MKI and MiG-29.

Insight- Even if Russia wants to deliver, it lacks the bandwidth and access to critical components.

India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat Push-Already Underway

• Since the early 2010s, India has been pushing to reduce imports-
  • The Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 added “negative import lists.”
  • Private sector participation encouraged in engines, drones, avionics.
• Russia losing contracts is not a sudden shift — it’s an acceleration of a pre-existing policy.
• Ukraine war made it clearer that import dependence = vulnerability.

Insight- The war did not “cause” India’s shift, but it validated India’s fears and gave urgency to building domestic industry.

The Replacement Problem

• Cancellation of Russian deals leaves capability gaps India can’t fill immediately.
• Example –
  • Light helicopters- Ka-226T cancellation left India with HAL’s LUH still in development.
  • Submarines- Russia’s struggles in the Project-75(I) race left India still looking for a partner.
  • Jet engines- Russian tech could not deliver; now India turns to Safran/GE. Domestic replacements will take years to mature; Western suppliers (GE, Safran, Airbus, etc.) may step in — but at higher cost and stricter conditions.

Insight- India is in a transition risk phase — moving away from Russia before its domestic industry is fully ready.

Impact on Russia’s Global Influence

• Russia has historically used arms exports to secure influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
• India was its largest customer — at one point, ~70% of India’s military hardware was Russian-origin.
• With India shifting away, and others (Vietnam, Indonesia, Egypt) hesitating too, Russia’s arms export revenue and leverage shrink.
• This creates space for France (Rafale, Safran), US (GE, Boeing, Lockheed), and Israel (drones, electronics) to expand their market share in India.

Insight- Russia’s inability to supply India weakens its diplomatic bargaining power, giving New Delhi more room to manoeuvre with multiple partners.

The Long-Term Play for India

• India doesn’t want to simply swap dependence from Russia to the West — it wants to use this moment to build domestic depth.
• Hence the insistence on technology transfer clauses in new contracts (e.g., GE F414, Safran engine co-development).
• Short-term- India will still buy foreign engines, radars, and subsystems.
• Long-term- India hopes to own the IP and build supply chains at home, reducing vulnerability to geopolitics.

Fact Nuggets to Anchor the Point

• Russia’s share in India’s arms imports fell from 69% (2012–16) to 46% (2017–21), per SIPRI.
• Delays- S-400 regiments originally due 2021, but only partial deliveries happened; Talwar frigates delayed by years.
• Ka-226T deal (200 helicopters, $1B+) cancelled due to lack of localization and engine sanctions.
• AMCA engine shift- from Russian interest to GE-Safran talks (with potential 80–100% ToT).
• IAF fleet challenge- India operates ~259 Su-30MKIs (Russian engines), but for Tejas Mk2 and AMCA, it’s now leaning Western.

Insight- India isn’t “punishing” Russia but is pragmatically recalibrating — diversifying away from a supplier whose industrial base is under sanctions and stress. This shift creates near- term capability risks but long-term opportunities for self-reliance and new partnerships.

Let’s understand this through infographic how India has gradually shifted from Russian defense deals toward domestic programs and Western partnerships (2015–2025).

• Russia Deals → Delays, cancellations, and risks (Ka-226T, S-400, P-75I).
• Western Partners → Entry of GE (F414), Safran (Kaveri/AMCA), stronger cooperation.
• India Policy → Atmanirbhar Bharat, DAP 2020, LUH production, import restrictions.

The bar chart comparison of jet engines linked to India’s fighter programs –

• Kaveri (GTRE)- 76 kN — struggled, remained only as a tech demonstrator.
• GE F404- 84 kN — operational in Tejas Mk1/1A.
• GE F414- 98 kN — selected for Tejas Mk2, already proven in global fighters.
• Safran–AMCA (planned)- 110+ kN — in development for India’s future AMCA stealth fighter.

This clearly shows how India has moved from underpowered indigenous attempts → proven Western engines → ambitious co-development for future autonomy.

Jet Engine Partnership Comparison

Key Takeaways

• Russia- Familiar partner, but engines are less advanced, and tech transfer is restricted. High political risk post-Ukraine war.
• U.S. (GE)- Provides proven engines, high reliability, and meaningful transfer — but with strings attached (export controls).
• France (Safran)- Most flexible partner, willing to co-develop a new engine, aligning with India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat vision.

So, India is moving away from Russia mainly because –

• Russian tech is lagging and restricted,
• U.S. and France offer next-gen, reliable solutions,
• And politically, dependence on Russia carries more risk than benefit now.

That said how Russia, U.S., and France score across the key factors through the comparative scores:

ComparativeScores(1=Poor,5=Excellent)

In short-

• Russia trails in tech transfer, reliability, and risk.
• The U.S. offers proven reliability with solid transfer but some political constraints.
• France edges ahead with deep tech transfer and co-development offers, making it India’s most promising long-term partner.

Conclusion

Putting it all together –

India needs a jet-engine partner who can deliver not just an engine, but the full package- design capability, source code, advanced metallurgy, full tech transfer, reliable maintenance, future upgrade autonomy.

Russia has strengths (experience, longstanding defence ties, useful testing facilities, etc.), but has repeatedly fallen short on some of the critical demands—tech transfer, performance specs, and long-term autonomy.

Western firms seem more willing (at least in current negotiations) to meet more of India’s demands in those critical areas, making them more attractive for next-generation engine programs.

So, India’s choice is driven not merely by friendship or past cooperation but by strategic, technical, economic, and geopolitical considerations—and in many of those, Russian options seem less aligned with India’s current priorities than Western ones.

For decades, Russia was India’s default aerospace partner. But as India sets its sights on fifth and sixth generation fighters like the AMCA and beyond, the demands of engine technology have changed. Russia’s unwillingness or inability to share full design data, combined with performance and reliability gaps, has made Western partners more attractive.

In the coming years, India’s choice of partner for its indigenous jet engine programs will shape not just the future of its Air Force, but also its standing as a true aerospace power.